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FROM SYSTEMIC RISK TO FINANCIAL




In the recent past, hedge funds have demonstrated that they can pose
and spread systemic risk across the financial markets, and that their
managers can use them to commit fraud and misappropriation of fund
assets. Even if the first issue now seems to be considered a serious one by
the U.S. legislature, which in 2010, as a legislative response to the global
financial crisis of 2007-2008, enacted the Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), the current regulation
still appears inconsistent and inappropriate to prevent and face it. By
contrast, the second issue is not always considered as a real priority, since
the only investors who are allowed to invest in hedge funds are
sophisticated, wealthy, and/or institutional—namely, investors who do not
need to be protected by regulation. However, this argument cannot be
shared in light of the number of scandals that recently involved hedge funds
damaging their investors, regardless of their level of sophistication and
wealth. Although Dodd-Frank includes among its legislative purposes the
protection of consumers from abusive financial services practices, its new
provisions do not seem to be able to achieve this result.
This Article argues that the current rules are not appropriate, or at
least are not enough, to address the problems that hedge funds can cause to
investors and markets. This Article therefore proposes to consider the
possibility of introducing new rules that can help prevent and counteract
these issues; namely, self-set limits on the use of leverage, the mandatory
involvement of a depositary-custodian with the task of controlling the
adviser’s activities, and the mandatory involvement of an external
independent valuer with the task of evaluating the fund’s assets on a
periodic basis. Even though the application of these rules could be costly
for the industry, this cost is reasonably motivated by very important
legislative aims, such as investor protection and systemic risk prevention
and counteraction.
* Marco Bodellini is an Adjunct Professor of Business Law and a Research Fellow at the
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INTRODUCTION
Hedge funds have demonstrated the capability to create two main
different kinds of issues. On one hand, they can pose and spread systemic
risk across the financial markets, and on the other hand, their managers can
use them to commit fraud and misappropriation of the fund’s assets, which,
in turn, can cause serious damages to the investors. Regarding the first
issue, while some deny that a single hedge fund can have an impact on the
market in terms of systemic risk1 because they are usually not systemically
important from the size point of view,2 it seems that the majority of
commentators now agree on their potential capability to pose and spread
these types of risks.3 Accordingly, evidence of the fact that they can
generate systemic risks, even when they are not themselves systemically
relevant, can be easily found by looking back at the quasi-failure of Long
Term Capital Management (LTCM),4 as well as at other significant
1. See Emily Kehoe, Hedge Fund “Regulation” for Systemic Risk: Largely Impossible, 14 J.
BUS. & SEC. L. 35, 35 (2013) (noting that single “individual hedge funds may present little or no
threat to the global economy”); see also Cecilia C. Lee, Reframing Complexity: Hedge Fund
Policy Paradigm for the Way Forward, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 478, 502 (2015)
(“[E]ven if individual hedge funds are unlikely to pose systemic risks, continuous monitoring of
the industry on the collective effects of their investment strategies and positions, along with their
interconnectedness to the overall global markets, is necessary to safeguard financial stability.”).
2. For an opposite point of view, see Anne Rivière, The Future of Hedge Fund Regulation: A
Comparative Approach United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany, 10 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 263, 265 (2011) (“The size and complexity of hedge funds may make some of
them systemically significant and likely to provoke chain reactions that could lead to a generalized
collapse of financial markets.”).
3. See Anita K. Krug, Rethinking U.S. Investment Adviser Regulation, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
451 (2013) (noting that, due to the huge amount of assets invested in hedge funds and their
tendency to invest in risky activities, such as credit default swaps, these vehicles can contribute to
the generation of systemic risks); Hossein Nabilou & Alessio M. Pacces, The Hedge Fund
Regulation Dilemma: Direct vs Indirect Regulation, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 183, 188
(2015) (The authors argue that even though hedge funds can bring some benefits, they can also
pose risks to financial systems and contribute to financial instability. This is mainly due to their
size and leverage, but also their interlinkages with large complex financial institutions, so-called
Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs)); Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 243, 247–48 (2013) (pointing out that some
studies suggest that hedge funds can destabilize the financial markets); Jón Daníelsson & Jean-
Pierre Zigrand, Regulating Hedge Funds, FIN. STABILITY REV., Apr. 2007, at 29, 30 (“Hedge
funds do . . . contribute to systemic risk whereby the failure of a systemically important hedge
fund has the potential to create sufficient uncertainty in the markets for liquidity to dry up and for
trading to cease with potentially costly consequences.”); JOHN KAMBHU ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS,
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, AND SYSTEMIC RISK 11–12 (2007) (“If systemic risk is
fundamentally about financial markets linkages to the real economy, then hedge funds create
systemic risk to the extent that they can disrupt the ability of financial intermediaries or financial
markets to efficiently provide credit.”).
4. As an example, consider what happened to LTCM in 1998. See Luther R. Ashworth II, Is
Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Necessary To Accomplish the Goals of the Dodd-Frank Act’s
Title IV?, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 651, 669–71 (2013) (“A group of highly reputable traders
formed LTCM in 1994. The fund had starting equity of $1.3 billion ($100 million of which was
contributed by the general partners) and required outside investors to invest at least $10 million.
At LTCM’s peak, in 1997, the fund grew to larger than $7 billion after the fund made returns of
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collapses.5 Currently, the systemic risk issue seems to be considered a
serious one by the U.S. legislature itself, which in 2010, as a legislative
response to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, enacted the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank
19.9% in 1994, 42.8% in 1995, 40.8% in 1996, and 17.1% in 1997. LTCM typically used an
investment strategy that held long positions in bonds that it considered undervalued and short
positions in bonds that it considered overvalued. Based on the yield spread between its positions
in high and low risk bonds, LTCM would essentially bet on the spread to widen or narrow using
derivatives contracts. In early 1998, LTCM became convinced, for a number of reasons, the yield
spread between its high and low risk bonds was too wide; thus, LTCM bet on the yield spread to
narrow. LTCM borrowed $125 billion from banks (on top of the fund’s then $4.8 billion AUM)
and increased its leverage ratio (debt-to-equity ratio) to more than 20-to-1. This leverage ratio,
which is extraordinarily large for any hedge fund, would magnify gains or losses depending on the
widening or narrowing of LTCM’s yield spread. Later that year, a number of circumstances
instilled fear in global bond investors and there was a ‘stampede to quality’ bonds. Thus, LTCM’s
yield spread widened (instead of narrowed) and the fund’s failed bet was exposed. In September
1998, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York became worried about LTCM’s creditors (including
banks and securities firms) that would suffer losses as a result of LTCM’s collapse. A creditor
consortium, including the government, decided that the collapse of LTCM posed ‘systemic risk’
(due to the number of overexposed parties and the amount of money involved) and agreed to a
bailout of over $3.6 billion. Systemic risk is defined as the risk that ‘an economic shock such as a
market or institutional failure triggers (through panic or otherwise) either the failure of a chain of
markets or institutions or a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, resulting in
increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability.’ Systemic risk can be paralleled to a
domino effect in which a trigger event (here LTCM’s collapse) ‘causes a chain of bad economic
consequences’ that have the potential to bring down other financial institutions and overall
markets. LTCM’s collapse was the first event that clearly demonstrated hedge funds could have
systemic risk consequences. The magnitude of LTCM’s exposure to other market participants
showed that a massive hedge fund’s failure could have devastating effects on the overall
market.”); see also Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV.
681, 681–82 (2000) (“The enormous size of the LTCM hedge fund placed its trading
counterparties and creditors in a position to lose substantial amounts because they had extended
excessive credit to LTCM, either through trading counterparty or lending relationships. Since
LTCM’s creditors and counterparties had allowed LTCM to build up dangerous levels of leverage,
they faced the real possibility that LTCM would default on the credit obligations it owed them. To
protect themselves from an LTCM default, some of the fund’s creditors and counterparties created
a consortium, which injected $3.6 billion in equity into LTCM in return for receiving ninety-
percent equity stake in the fund. Banking regulators assisted LTCM creditors and counterparties in
creating the consortium because they feared that LTCM’s losses could cause financial shock to the
markets if LTCM’s seventy-five counterparties sought to liquidate their positions simultaneously
in response to an LTCM default.”).
5. See Kaal, supra note 3, at 245–46. (“Several spectacular hedge fund failures seemed to
confirm that the failure of systematically important hedge funds could have the potential to create
such uncertainty as to impede trading, and in a worst case scenario, could cause damage to the real
economy.”).
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Act),6 mainly to promote the financial stability of the United States and its
markets.7
The second issue is not always considered a real priority on the basis of
the assumption that the only investors who are allowed to invest in hedge
funds are sophisticated, wealthy, and/or institutional;8 namely investors who
do not need to be protected by regulation.9 In other words, the fact that
these investors are sophisticated, wealthy, and/or institutional would itself
mean that they are able to fend for themselves, and therefore there would be
no need to enhance regulation and supervision.10 This argument can be
criticized, though, in light of the number of scandals that in the recent past
6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 11, and 15
U.S.C.). The Dodd-Frank Act, an abbreviated reference for the ‘Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act,’ was signed into law on July 21, 2010. The part of the Act dealing
with the hedge fund industry is Title IV entitled the ‘Private Fund Investment Advisers
Registration Act 2010’ (PFIARA). Id. §§ 401–02.
7. More precisely, the goals that the Dodd-Frank Act declares to pursue are: “To promote the
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to
protect consumers from abusive financial services practices” and others. Id. § 401; Krug, supra
note 3, at 451.
8. The fact that just these kinds of investors are allowed to invest in hedge funds is the legal
effect arising from the application of a number of exemptions and exceptions promulgated in the
main U.S. securities law acts which these vehicles usually enjoy in order to avoid strict regulation
and supervision.
9. This is the position of many commentators. See, e.g., Carl J. Nelson, Hedge Fund
Regulation: A Proposal to Maintain Hedge Funds’ Effectiveness Without SEC Regulation, 2
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 221, 222, 229 (2007) (“Hedge fund investors can adequately
protect themselves since they are generally sophisticated investors” and additionally, “investor
protection does not justify increased hedge fund regulation because hedge fund investors are a
small, elite segment of the investing public.”); Gibson, supra note 4, at 713–4 (“A review of
existing federal regulation suggests that hedge fund regulation to protect investors is not
necessary. Hedge funds typically limit their solicitation to institutional investors and persons with
substantial net worth. Both of these groups are less in need of the regulatory protection provided
by SEC and CFTC than the general investing public. Therefore, investor protection is not
necessary to the extent that hedge funds are trading in securities or commodities . . . . [M]oreover,
hedge fund investors can use the judicial forum to obtain legal redress for abusive or fraudulent
practices perpetrated against them in connection with hedge fund trading activity. Hedge fund
investors may also bring a private right of action against parties that have violated the federal
securities laws in connection with hedge fund trading. Hedge fund investors are also protected by
the antifraud provisions found within the securities and commodities laws. Moreover, hedge fund
managers that are CPOs, while possibly exempt from certain ongoing compliance obligations
under the CEA, remain subject to the broad anti fraud provisions found within the Act. All of
these anti fraud provisions provide hedge fund investors with sufficient protection against
fraudulent practices of hedge fund managers, obviating the need for federal regulation.”); see Troy
A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style
and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 976 (2006) (arguing for default rather than mandatory
rules for hedge funds); Kaal, supra note 3, at 244 (noting that “[h]edge funds’ ability to invest in
global markets without supervision and significant disclosure obligations was important for
successful hedge fund launches, helped generate higher returns, and attracted investors”).
10. However, it is worth noting that among the goals that the Dodd-Frank Act declares to
pursue there is also the protection of the consumers from abusive financial services practices.
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have involved hedge funds damaging their investors.11 Additionally, due to
a phenomenon called “retailization,”12 today even investors who are neither
particularly sophisticated nor very wealthy can potentially invest in hedge
funds. These elements seem to be able to prove that an investor protection
issue exists and, as such, it should be taken into consideration by the U.S.
legislature. Although Dodd-Frank includes among its legislative purposes
the protection of consumers from abusive financial services practices,13 its
new provisions—which will be deeply analyzed in the following sections—
do not seem to be able to achieve this result.
This Article analyzes the rationale behind the new rules governing the
U.S. hedge fund industry—as amended with the adoption of the 2010
Dodd-Frank Act—and argues that the current regulation is inconsistent and
inappropriate to prevent and face the two main issues posed by these
particular financial players, namely the creation and spread of systemic risk
as well as the commission of fraud. Therefore, this Article proposes the
introduction of new rules, such as limits on the use of leverage, the
mandatory involvement of a depositary-custodian with the tasks of
safekeeping the fund’s assets and also overseeing the adviser’s activities,
and the mandatory involvement of an external independent valuer with the
task of evaluating the fund’s assets on a periodic basis. In fact, it is likely
that such rules could help address and counteract the issues generated by the
activities of these financial entities.
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW
For a long time, before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, there
was a vigorous debate surrounding the appropriateness of enhancing the
11. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS (2003),
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS];
accord Roberta S. Karmel, Iosco’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 37 J. CORP. L. 849, 862–63
(2012) (“[A]buses and insolvencies by some hedge funds have demonstrated that investor
protection is an issue.”); see also Kaal, supra note 3, at 244; George Sami, A Comparative
Analysis of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States and Europe, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
275, 279 (2009); Paul M. Jonna, In Search of Market Discipline: The Case for Indirect Hedge
Fund Regulation, 45 SANDIEGO L. REV. 989, 1008 (2008).
12. It is a process that makes hedge fund interests available even to unsophisticated and small
investors. See Jonna, supra note 11, at 1007–08; Kaal, supra note 3, at 260; Thierry O. Desmet,
Understanding Hedge Fund Adviser Regulation, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 8–9 (2008) (explaining
that due to this phenomenon called retailization, even less affluent investors have started to
participate in hedge funds); Matthew Lewis, A Transatlantic Dilemma: A Comparative Review of
American and British Hedge Fund Regulation, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 347, 363 (2008) (“[T]he
retailization of hedge funds unduly exposes unqualified investors to the risks hedge funds pose,
through ineffective minimum investor requirements and increased participation by mainstream
investment vehicles like pension funds.”).
13. Among its legislative aims there is also “to protect consumers from abusive financial
services practices.” Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 11, and 15 U.S.C.).
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regulation and supervision of hedge funds and hedge fund managers.14
However, despite some attempts made by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)15 up until the crisis, the U.S. hedge fund industry
benefited from a substantial lack of regulation and supervision. This has
been considered one of the reasons for the industry’s success in terms of
growth of the number of funds, the amount of assets under management,16
and financial performance.17 However, this has also been one of the reasons
14. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 221–22; Desmet, supra note 12, at 1; Jonna, supra note 11, at
991; Sami, supra note 11, at 275; Lewis, supra note 12, at 347; David Schneider, If at First You
Don’t Succeed: Why the SEC Should Try and Try Again to Regulate Hedge Fund Advisers, 9 J.
BUS. & SEC. L. 261, 263 (2009); Gibson, supra note 4, at 681.
15. See Harvey Bines & Steve Thel, The Varieties of Investment Management Law, 21
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 153–54 (2016) (underscoring that the SEC in July 2004 proposed
rule 203(b)(3)-2 to require hedge fund advisers with more than fifteen funds to register under the
Investment Adviser Act of 1940. “The SEC cited three factors that caused the majority to be
concerned with hedge fund advisers: (1) the growth in the number and size of hedge funds; (2)
incidents of hedge fund advisers engaging in fraudulent activity, including exaggerated
performance claims, payment of inappropriate commissions, and misappropriation of investor
assets; and (3) the retailization of hedge funds, with smaller investors, pensioners, and other
market participants directly or indirectly investing in hedge funds. The rule proposed that each
owner of a private fund (that is, a fund that would have to register as an investment company but
for the exemptions provided by Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act) that
permits owners to redeem part of their investments within two years of purchase and that offers
interests based on the expertise of the adviser be counted as a separate client for purposes of
deciding whether the adviser has to register. The redemption provision of the definition of private
funds was designed to exclude private equity funds from the registration requirement. The
dissenters questioned the majority’s premises, and encouraged those to be affected to submit
comments to the SEC. The response was heavy, but the SEC, with the same division, adopted
Rule 203(b)(3)-2, requiring advisers to most hedge funds to register by Feb. 1, 2006. The effect of
the rule was not only to require registration, but also to require the newly registered advisers to
adopt compliance provisions and subject them to SEC examination and other provisions of the
Advisers Act. An advisory firm and the hedge fund it managed challenged the new rule before the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which vacated the rule in Goldstein v. SEC.
Although the court noted the substantive criticism of the rule made by the dissenting
commissioners, its opinion focused on the language of the Advisers Act, particularly on the word
‘client’ in Section 203(b)(3), which, at the time, exempted advisers which had fewer than 15
clients during the course of the preceding 12 months. The Commission took the position that each
investor in a hedge fund was a client of the fund’s adviser. The court rejected this position as
unreasonable or even arbitrary. On the basis of a far-ranging discussion of the use of the word
‘client’ in the securities laws and in commerce generally, the court concluded that a hedge fund
adviser’s only client is the fund, and not those who invest in the fund. Accordingly, the court
concluded, the Commission could not deprive a hedge fund adviser of the exemption of Section
203(b)(3).”).
16. See Kaal, supra note 3, at 244 (emphasizing that hedge funds’ ability to invest in global
markets without supervision and significant disclosure obligations was important for their success.
From the opposite perspective, in fact, regulatory oversight could make it more difficult for such
funds to generate absolute returns and therefore to attract investors); see also Kehoe, supra note 1,
at 35–36 (noting that the use of leverage and the freedom to diversify the composition of their
portfolios allow them to perform risky but potentially remunerative strategies; the author also
observes that their success depends on factors that have the potential to create systemic risks).
17. See Kehoe, supra note 1, at 37 (“It is the flexibility of hedge funds, only possible because
of a lack of regulation, which contributes to their financial prowess.”); see also Scott V. Wagner,
Hedge Funds: The Final Frontier of Securities Regulation and a Last Hope for Economic Revival,
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for the high number of failures and scandals affecting the markets and
investors.
Even if hedge funds were not deemed to be the cause of the global
financial crisis of 2007-2008,18 the U.S. legislature, as well as many other
legislatures and financial regulators over the world,19 have been concerned
about their potential to pose and spread systemic risk across the markets.20
This is due to their involvement in many different types of complex and
risky transactions, performed with many different types of counterparties
across many different jurisdictions.21 The significant level of leverage
6 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2009) (“The lack of regulation has been paramount to the hedge
fund’s success.”).
18. See Andrew W. Lo, Regulatory Reform in the Wake of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008,
1 J. FIN. ECON. POL’Y 4, 16 (2009) (“While the shadow banking system has no doubt contributed
to systemic risk in the financial industry, hedge funds have played only a minor role in the current
financial crisis, as evidenced by the lack of attention they have received in the government’s
recent bailout efforts.”); Jim Buller & Nicole Lindstrom, Hedging its Bets: The U.K. and the
Politics of European Financial Services Regulation, 18 NEW POL. ECON. 391, 392 (2013) (“It is
widely accepted that banking sector, not the alternative investment industry, was primarily
responsible for the global financial crisis.”); see also Desmet, supra note 12, at 1.
19. See European Comm’n, Statement at the Occasion of the European Parliament Vote on the
Directive on Hedge Funds and Private Equity (Nov. 11, 2010) (where it is possible to read the
opinion of the President of the European Commission, who emphasized that “the adoption of the
directive means that hedge funds and private equity will no longer operate in a regulatory void
outside the scope of supervisors. The new regime brings transparency and security to the way
these funds are managed and operate, which adds to the overall stability of our financial system.
After important decisions on a new European supervisory architecture earlier this autumn, today’s
directive—which coincides with the G20 Summit meeting in Seoul—is another example of how
the EU is leading the way in implementing our G20 commitments.”). In 2011, the European
Union adopted the Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2011, the so-called Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), in order to
enhance the regulation applied mainly to hedge fund managers. Recital (1) of the AIFMD states
that “managers of alternative investment funds (AIFMs) are responsible for the management of a
significant amount of invested assets in the Union, account for significant amounts of trading in
markets for financial instruments, and can exercise an important influence on markets and
companies in which they invest.” Recital (2) of the AIFMD adds that “the impact of AIFMs on the
markets in which they operate is largely beneficial, but recent financial difficulties have
underlined how the activities of AIFMs may also serve to spread or amplify risks through the
financial system. Uncoordinated national responses make the efficient management of those risks
difficult.” Recital (3) of the AIFMD emphasizes that “recent difficulties in financial markets have
underlined that many AIFM strategies are vulnerable to some or several important risks in relation
to investors, other market participants and markets.” See Marco Bodellini, The European Union
Regulation on Marketing of Alternative Investment Funds: Another Step Towards Integration of
the European Union Financial Market, 37 BUS. L. REV. 208 (2016); Marco Bodellini, The
Marketing of Hedge Funds in the United Kingdom: Did the System Maintain its Attractiveness
After the Transposition of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive?, 37 BUS. L. REV.
162 (2016).
20. The failure of two Bear Sterns hedge funds in 2007 is conventionally considered the
beginning of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. See Lee, supra note 1, at 490 (“The failure
of two hedge funds sponsored by Bear Sterns in July 2007 sounded the first alarm of trouble. The
subsequent run on Bear Sterns in March 2008 also involved its hedge fund customers and
derivative counterparties.”).
21. This is the position, among others, of Anne Rivière. See Rivière supra note 2, at 265
(pointing out that systemic risk is the risk of chain reactions of failures due to the deep
424 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 11
characterizing many such funds before the crisis22 and the sector’s large size
and growth further increased this concern.23 Additionally, some scandals
involving hedge funds in the recent past had clearly shown that they could
be used as a means to defraud the investors.24
Therefore, due primarily to the global financial crisis,25 and to the
aforementioned financial scandals,26 the U.S. legislature decided to enhance
the regulation and supervision of hedge fund managers by passing Dodd-
Frank in 2010.27
interconnections among different markets. Some hedge funds, nowadays, are large enough to
potentially pose systemic risks); Dan Awrey, The Limits of EU Hedge Fund Regulation, 5 L. &
FIN. MKTS. REV. 119 (2011) (emphasizing that the financial crisis of 2007-2009 had increased the
idea that it was necessary to rethink the regulatory framework of the financial markets and
institutions); see also Dirk A. Zetzsche, Introduction: Overview, Regulatory History and
Technique, Transition, in THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE 3 (Dirk
A. Zetzsche ed., 2012) (underscoring that the G20 decided to subject all participants in the
financial markets to regulation).
22. Kaal, supra note 3, at 246 (underscoring that concerns regarding the excessive use of
leverage by hedge funds led to increasing demands for enhancing the regulation); Maria
Strömqvist, Hedge Funds and Financial Crises, 1 ECON. REV. 87, 89–90 (2009) (“The high
degree of leverage entails risks for the counterparties of the hedge funds (for example the lenders)
and the failure of a fund may therefore have contagion effects in the financial system.”); Barbara
Crutchfield George & Lynn V. Dymally, The End of An Era of Limited Oversight: The
Restructured Regulatory Landscape of Private Investment Funds Through the U.S. Dodd-Frank
Act and the E.U. Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, 25 FLA. J. INT’L L. 207 (2013).
23. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, UPDATE ON REVIEW OF ASSET MANAGEMENT
PRODUCTS AND ACTIVITIES (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/news/Documents/
FSOC%20Update%20on%20Review%20of%20Asset%20Management%20Products%20and%20
Activities.pdf [hereinafter FSOC UPDATE] (“As of December 2014, U.S. pooled investment
vehicles (excluding money market mutual funds) had approximately $25.8 trillion of assets.
Mutual funds accounted for the largest share, with $13.1 trillion of assets, or fifty one percent of
the total. Hedge funds accounted for the second largest share, with $3.4 trillion, or thirteen percent
of total assets.”); see also SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF INV. MGMT, RISK & EXAMINATIONS
OFFICE, PRIVATE FUND STATISTICS, FOURTH CALENDAR QUARTER 2014 5 (2015), https://www.
sec.gov/divisions/investment/private-funds-statistics/private-funds-statistics-2014-q4.pdf; see also
Lee, supra note 1, at 486 (“[G]lobal hedge fund capital experienced ‘the highest calendar year of
inflows since 2007’ to reach a record of $2.85 trillion at the end of 2014.”).
24. See GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 11, at 2–3; accord Karmel, supra note 11, at
862–63 (“[A]buses and insolvencies by some hedge funds have demonstrated that investor
protection is an issue.”); see also Kaal, supra note 3, at 260; Sami, supra note 11, at 275–76;
Jonna, supra note 11, at 992–94.
25. See Joshua C. Dawson & Paul J. Foley, Square Pegs Don’t Fit in Round Holes: The
Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act’s Elimination of the Private Fund Exemption On Private Equity
Fund Advisers, 9 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 445, 466 (2015) (“The Dodd-Frank Act was a reaction to a
major financial crisis.”).
26. See GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 11, at 2–3; accord Karmel, supra note 11, at
862–63; see also Kaal, supra note 3, at 260; Sami, supra note 11, at 275–76; Jonna, supra note 11,
at 992–94.
27. It is worth noting that even before the crisis, the debate concerning hedge fund regulation
and supervision was rather animated. Some huge collapses that occurred in the U.S. between the
end of the 1990s (LTCM) and the beginning of the 2000s (Amaranth) enhanced the idea of the
need for more regulation and supervision in this specific sector of the financial industry. For this
reason, the SEC in the past tried to introduce rules imposing the mandatory registration of the
hedge fund advisers. See Schneider, supra note 14, at 279–82 (“The 2003 SEC Staff Report
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III. DEFINING HEDGE FUNDS
Before analyzing the regulation, it is worth understanding what hedge
funds are from a financial point of view, given that many different
collective investment undertakings, using diverse financial strategies, are
considered in practice to be hedge funds. From a historical point of view,
many agree that Alfred Winslow Jones established the first hedge fund in
1949.28 The financial innovation introduced by Jones was to combine long
positions with short positions in order to hedge against the market’s
movements.29 The hedging resulted from the fact that a long position
appreciates when the value of the held security rises, while a short position
investigated the hedge funds industry and recommended that the SEC require hedge fund advisers
to register under the Advisers Act. Despite a litany of public policy reasons, the SEC’s statutory
hook was the legislative history behind the private adviser exemption. The purpose of the private
adviser exemption was to exempt advisers with a small number of clients because they posed little
or no risk to national markets. The crafters of the private adviser exemption determined that
investment advisers with fourteen clients or less had such a de minimis effect on national markets
that it was unnecessary for the SEC to regulate them. The SEC, however, concluded that many
hedge funds were using the private adviser exemption in contradiction of the exemption’s
intended purpose. Because hedge funds were rapidly growing in number and size, increasingly
engaging in fraudulent acts, and offering their products directly or indirectly to a broader group of
less sophisticated investors, the SEC decided that the hedge fund industry’s potentially adverse
implications on markets and investors justified a change of the interpretation of the term ‘client.’
In a 3-2 decision, the SEC Commissioners adopted the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule. The 2004 Hedge
Fund Rule defined each owner of a private fund as a ‘client’ for purposes of determining whether
the adviser satisfied the private adviser exemption. A private fund is defined as a company: (i)
That would be an investment company under section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act of
1940, but for the exception provided from that definition by either section 3(c)(1) or section
3(c)(7) of such Act; (ii) That permits its owners to redeem any portion of their ownership interests
within two years of the purchase of such interests; and (iii) Interests in which are or have been
offered based on the investment advisory skills, ability or expertise of the investment adviser.
Because most hedge funds satisfy the definition of a private fund, the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule
applied a ‘look-through’ to hedge funds. In contrast to the 1985 Safe Harbor Rule, which counted
each fund as one client, the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule counted each investor as one client. Thus,
many hedge funds advisers no longer satisfied the private adviser exemption under the Advisers
Act and were required to register with the SEC. In 2005, Philip Goldstein, a co-owner of the
investment advisory firm Kimball & Winthrop, challenged the enforceability of the 2004 Hedge
Fund Rule. Goldstein argued that Congress unambiguously intended the term ‘client’ to mean the
fund, and not the investors in the fund. Furthermore, even if the term ‘client’ was ambiguous, the
SEC’s definition was not reasonable because the SEC drastically exceeded the term’s ‘probability
of meaning’ and the SEC’s adoption of the rule was arbitrary and capricious. The SEC responded
that it was within its regulatory powers to apply a ‘look-through’ in the case of private funds. The
SEC argued that the Advisers Act’s use of the term ‘client’ was ambiguous and the SEC’s
interpretation was reasonable because it was ‘consistent with the objectives of the Act, [and] it
needed to close a loophole that had arisen due to changed circumstances since the safe harbor was
adopted in 1985.’ On June 23, 2006, the D.C. Circuit Court ruled in favor of Goldstein.”).
28. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 223; Jonna, supra note 11, at 1008 (“Alfred Winslow Jones is
credited as the first investor to start a hedge fund. Jones held short and long positions in stocks and
sought to insulate himself against market fluctuation.”); see also Lewis, supra note 12, at 360
(“Alfred Winslow Jones, the father of the hedge fund industry, founded the first true hedge fund in
1949.”).
29. See Jonna, supra note 11, at 1008.
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appreciates when the underlying security’s value falls.30 The combination of
both of these positions in the same portfolio allows the investor to reduce
the risk of losses.31 Due to the great performance of the Jones fund, the
concept of a “hedge fund” became increasingly popular.32
It is rather difficult to provide a precise definition of the term “hedge
fund,”33 as this expression comes from the financial industry and is used to
refer to a broad variety of pooled investment vehicles performing many
different financial strategies. It follows that there is no universal definition
of a hedge fund.34 Nevertheless, it is also true that there are some common
features that can be taken into consideration to distinguish hedge funds
from other types of collective investment undertakings. These common
features have been used by international organizations to create “catch-all”
definitions. For example, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) developed identification guidelines for hedge funds
to cover funds that (1) are considered hedge funds under local law; (2)
declare themselves to be one; or (3) display a combination of some of the
following characteristics: (i) use of leverage; (ii) performance fees based on
unrealized gains; (iii) complex strategies, which may include the use of
derivatives, short selling, high frequency trading, and/or the search for
absolute returns; and (iv) a tendency to invest in financial rather than
physical assets.35
Usually, hedge funds are privately organized vehicles36 that are
administered and managed by professional investment managers; their
interests are sold to wealthy and sophisticated investors, as well as to
institutional investors.37 This also means that they are usually not directly
addressed to retail investors. As a legal effect, they are typically not
publicly traded and therefore their interests are rather illiquid and quite
difficult to value. Given that these are financial products offered to
sophisticated, wealthy, and/or institutional investors, hedge fund managers
usually require a high initial minimum investment and they often also fix a
so-called lock-up period, during which the participants are not allowed to
withdraw the money they have invested. This legal mechanism plays an
30. Usually, short positions are obtained by short selling stocks.
31. See Jonna, supra note 11, at 1008.
32. See Ashworth, supra note 4, at 656–57.
33. See Schneider, supra note 14, at 264 (using the expression “defining the indefinable”).
34. See Lee, supra note 1, at 484.
35. INT’L ORG. SEC. COMM’NS, REPORT ON THE SECOND IOSCO HEDGE FUND SURVEY
(2013), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD427.pdf; see also INT’L ORG. SEC.
COMM’NS, HEDGE FUNDS OVERSIGHT: FINAL REPORT (2009), http://www.iosco.org/library/
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD293.pdf [hereinafter FINAL IOSCO REPORT]; Karmel, supra note 11, at
851.
36. See Kehoe, supra note 1, at 38 (emphasizing that typically the fund is just one or two
accounts, with no employees or corporate personnel).
37. See Rivière, supra note 2, at 266–67.
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important role in allowing the managers to take long-term positions and
invest in illiquid assets that sometimes can provide higher returns.38
The typical assets in which hedge funds invest are securities, including
shares, bonds, and derivatives, and other illiquid assets, such as
commodities and properties.39 Some hedge funds are supposed to be
particularly risky as they invest a significant amount of money in highly
speculative financial products, such as collateralized debt obligations, credit
default swaps,40 and short sell securities—namely they sell securities that
they do not own.41 Often, even if not always, hedge funds are also
characterized by a relevant level of debt that is used by their managers to
increase certain investment positions with the intention of amplifying
gains.42 It is also commonly said that hedge funds are rather secretive and
opaque financial players, as information about them is typically quite
scarce.43
Furthermore, hedge fund investment strategies can vary significantly
case by case; however, generally their managers seek to achieve absolute
return, namely to gain profits regardless of the financial markets’
performance. In fact, their goal is to generate so-called “alpha”—that is, the
excess return of the fund compared to a benchmark index.44 Therefore, the
alpha shows by how much a fund outperforms the markets, which can serve
as a measurement of the managerial skills.45 Similarly, the remuneration
structure is usually built in the same way. Typically, the managers receive a
1-2% fee calculated on the assets under management—a management fee—
and used to cover the fund’s operating costs, and a 15-25% fee calculated
on the profits made in a given year—a performance fee.46 Some of these
elements, mainly the high level of leverage, the tendency to short sell
stocks, and the use of derivatives may make the investment in hedge funds
38. Robert Novy-Marx, On the Excess Returns to Illiquidity 1 (Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices
Univ. of Chi. Working Paper 2004).
39. See Gibson, supra note 4, at 684 (“[H]edge funds invest in a broad array of financial
products, including debt and equity securities, futures, options, over-the-counter derivatives, and
foreign currencies.”).
40. See George & Dymally, supra note 22, at 212.
41. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 235 n.127 (explaining that short selling or taking a short
position mean “[b]orrowing a security (or commodity futures contract) from a broker and selling
it, with the understanding that it must later be bought back (hopefully at a lower price) and
returned to the broker”).
42. See Kehoe supra note 1, at 37 (emphasizing that leverage and the possibility to largely
diversify portfolio composition are some of the main reasons why hedge funds can outperform
mutual funds).
43. See Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The Opaque and Under-Regulated Hedge Fund
Industry: Victim or Culprit in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 359, 366
(2009) (defining the hedge fund industry as opaque and under-regulated).
44. See generally William A. Roach Jr., Hedge Fund Regulation: “What Side of the Hedges
Are You On?,” 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 165 (2009) (arguing that generation of alpha is one of the
significant features of hedge funds).
45. See Nabilou & Pacces, supra note 3, at 186.
46. Rivière, supra note 2, at 267.
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particularly risky for their investors. Additionally, these elements cause
hedge funds to have a potential impact on the financial markets in terms of
posing and spreading systemic risk.47 The layer of opacity and secrecy that
typically characterizes these vehicles emphasizes both of these factors.48
From the opposite perspective, many tend to underscore that hedge funds
bring many benefits to the markets, particularly providing liquidity.49
Although for a long time a legal or statutory definition of the term
“hedge fund” has been lacking,50 currently, the so-called Form PF51 defines
a hedge fund as “any private fund having any one of these three common
characteristics: (1) a performance fee that takes into account market value
(instead of only realized gains); (2) high leverage; or (3) short selling.”52 It
is worth emphasizing that this legal definition is rather helpful in order to
clearly identify these funds and easily distinguish them from other types of
collective investment vehicles.
IV. EXEMPTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS ALLOWING HEDGE
FUNDS AND HEDGE FUND MANAGERS TO AVOID
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
Typically, U.S. hedge funds are established as limited partnerships or
limited liability companies53 in Delaware,54 while many hedge fund
47. See Krug, supra note 3, at 451 (noting that, due to the hedge fund’s tendency to invest in
risky activities, such as credit default swaps, these vehicles can help the generation of systemic
risks); see also Kehoe, supra note 1, at 37 (emphasizing that regulators worry that over-leveraged
hedge funds can impact the stability of the markets depending on their level of liquidity and
market positions).
48. See George et al., supra note 43, at 363.
49. See Schneider, supra note 14, at 292–93 (listing the main benefits provided by hedge
funds: “First, in contrast to many stocks and bonds, most hedge funds profit when there is less
volatility in the market because hedge funds rely on historical price trends and arbitrage spreads.
Second, hedge funds contribute to more efficient and more liquid markets because they exploit
arbitrage spreads and other market miscalculations. Third, because hedge funds often invest in
derivative instruments, hedge funds foster the financial markets’ management and transfer of risk.
Fourth, hedge funds allow investors to diversify their portfolio based on their appetite for risk”);
see Rivière, supra note 2, at 270 (“Hedge funds bring benefits to the financial markets. Indeed,
they are said to increase liquidity and enhance efficiency. For instance, hedge funds help provide
efficiencies in pricing of securities in all market conditions thanks to their extensive research and
willingness to make investments. Moreover, by providing a counterparty to institutions wishing to
hedge their risks, hedge funds often help to disperse risk and lower volatility.”).
50. It was commonly said that before the adoption of this reform there was no statutory
definition of hedge funds. See Nabilou & Pacces, supra note 3, at 185.
51. Form PF is the form used by the SEC in order to gather data from investment advisers to
assess systemic risk.
52. Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool
Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
3308, 76 Fed. Reg. 71,128 (Nov. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 and 279). Note
that such definition is limited to the purposes of Form PF, and also adopted for Form ADV. Id. at
71,133 n.63.
53. See Lyman Johnson, Why Register Hedge Fund Advisers – A Comment, 70 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 713, 715 (2013); Lewis, supra note 12, at 351 n.29.
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managers reside in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.55 Historically,
hedge funds and hedge fund managers in the U.S. have benefited from the
various different exemptions and exceptions provided by the securities laws
in order to avoid being strictly regulated and supervised.56 The main
securities laws that carry a potential impact on the hedge fund industry are:
(1) the Securities Act of 1933;57 (2) the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934;58 (3) the Investment Company Act of 1940;59 and (4) the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940.60
A. THE SECURITIESACT OF 1933
The Securities Act of 1933 focuses mainly on the offers and sales of
securities made by an issuer to the public for the purpose of raising
money.61 The most relevant aspect of this legislation is the burden for the
issuer to file a registration statement with the SEC. This statement is
significant as it is potential investors’ main source of information regarding
54. Ashworth, supra note 4, at 660 (pointing out that these structures give hedge funds more
flexibility in setting the relationships between the manager and the investors and additionally are
particularly efficient from the tax point of view; however it is worth noting that many hedge funds
are established in offshore jurisdictions such as Cayman Islands or British Virgin Islands, mainly
for tax purposes); Johnson, supra note 53, at 715–16 (“Whether organized in a state in the United
States or under the law of the Cayman Islands, hedge fund vehicles are not stringently regulated
under any of these laws. Under U.S. law, moreover, notably Delaware, states have adopted a
highly flexible, contractarian approach, allowing the fund sponsor to craft a deal document that
contractually specifies investor rights. If it is not set forth in the partnership or operating
agreement, investors do not have it, including ongoing access to full information. Moreover, the
sponsors themselves can reduce or even eliminate their fiduciary duties, thereby removing even
traditional state law safeguards for egregious adviser conduct.”).
55. Lewis, supra note 12, at 351 n.29 (noting that the fund managers “are mostly based in the
United States, with a concentration in New York City and in Greenwich, Connecticut”); Desmet,
supra note 12, at 5 (noting that in 2005 “[i]n the United States the highest concentration of hedge
fund advisers appears to be in Connecticut”).
56. Ashworth, supra note 4, at 652 (“Hedge funds have avoided direct regulation under federal
securities laws for most of their existence.”); see also George & Dymally, supra note 22, at 209;
Rivière, supra note 2, at 267; Kaitlin Curry Albiez, Hedge Fund Oversight and Title IV: Less
Than Meets the Eye, 37 SETONHALL LEGIS. J. 145, 151–54 (2012); Sami, supra note 11, at 281.
57. See generally Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)).
58. See generally Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2012)).
59. See generally Investment Company Act, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64 (2012)).
60. See generally Investment Advisors Act, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–80b-21 (2012)); see also Cary Martin, One Step Forward for
Hedge Fund Investors: The Removal of the Solicitation Ban and the Challenges That Lie Ahead,
16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1143, 1150 (2014); Schneider, supra note 14, at 272; Gibson, supra note 4, at
688; Ashworth, supra note 4, at 662; Cary Martin, Private Investment Companies in the Wake of
the Financial Crisis: Rethinking the Effectiveness of the Sophisticated Investor Exemption, 37
DEL. J. CORP. L. 49, 60–61, 63–64 (2012); George & Dymally, supra note 22, at 219–20; Rivière,
supra note 2, at 272–78; Albiez, supra note 56, at 150; Sami, supra note 11, at 282–86; Lewis,
supra note 12, at 351–52.
61. See Schneider, supra note 14, at 272.
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the issuer’s business, properties, material legal proceedings, directors and
officers, ownership, and financials. This legal obligation has to be fulfilled
every time an issuer publicly offers securities. Usually, hedge fund interests
are considered securities under the Securities Act,62 because securities are
broadly defined as notes, stocks, treasury stocks, futures, bonds, debentures,
investment contracts, and many other financial instruments.63 The catchall
category of investment contracts qualifies hedge fund interests as a security,
due to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “investment contract” as “an
investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of
profits to be derived from entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.”64
However, Section 4 of the Securities Act also provides a number of
exempted transactions, namely transactions where the issuer is not required
to file a registration statement with the SEC. Typically, hedge funds benefit
from the exemption laid down in Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act
regarding “transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering,” and
called the “private offering exemption.” The Securities Act does not define
the concept of “public offering.” To provide more clarity on the matter, the
SEC issued the so-called Regulation D; here, the SEC added further details
to clarify when a transaction is not a public offering. Rule 506 of
Regulation D states that offerings of interests that are only addressed to
purchasers who qualify as “accredited investors”65 are exempt. This
62. In fact, usually hedge funds are established as limited partnerships or limited liability
companies. See Ashworth, supra note 4, at 660.
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). Under this section
[t]he term ‘security’ means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-
based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas,
or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or
based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into
on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security,’ or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Id.
64. See Ashworth, supra note 4, at 663–64 (citing United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 852 (1975)) (“Note that the quoted investment contract test in Forman is derived from
the original investment contract test in SEC v. Howey.”). The original Howey investment contract
test states, “[t]he test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.” Id. at 664 n.72. “Hedge funds
offer their limited partnership and limited liability company interests to passive investors who
receive nominal (or no) management authority-and because these investors expect profits from
management (efforts of others), most hedge fund offerings qualify as investment contracts.” Id. at
664.
65. Under 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15)
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[t]he term ‘accredited investor’ shall mean—(i) a bank as defined in section 3(a)(2)
whether acting in its individual or fiduciary capacity; an insurance company as defined
in paragraph (13) of this subsection; an investment company registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 or a business development company as defined in
section 2(a)(48) of that Act; a Small Business Investment Company licensed by the
Small Business Administration; or an employee benefit plan, including an individual
retirement account, which is subject to the provisions of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, if the investment decision is made by a plan fiduciary, as
defined in section 3(21) of such Act, which is either a bank, insurance company, or
registered investment adviser; or (ii) any person who, on the basis of such factors as
financial sophistication, net worth, knowledge, and experience in financial matters, or
amount of assets under management qualifies as an accredited investor under rules and
regulations which the Commission shall prescribe.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15). In addition, under 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)
[a]ccredited investor shall mean any person who comes within any of the following
categories, or who the issuer reasonably believes comes within any of the following
categories, at the time of the sale of the securities to that person: (1) Any bank as
defined in section 3(a)(2) of the Act, or any savings and loan association or other
institution as defined in section 3(a)(5)(A) of the Act whether acting in its individual or
fiduciary capacity; any broker or dealer registered pursuant to section 15 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; any insurance company as defined in section 2(a)(13)
of the Act; any investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of
1940 or a business development company as defined in section 2(a)(48) of that Act; any
Small Business Investment Company licensed by the U.S. Small Business
Administration under section 301(c) or (d) of the Small Business Investment Act of
1958; any plan established and maintained by a state, its political subdivisions, or any
agency or instrumentality of a state or its political subdivisions, for the benefit of its
employees, if such plan has total assets in excess of $5,000,000; any employee benefit
plan within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 if
the investment decision is made by a plan fiduciary, as defined in section 3(21) of such
act, which is either a bank, savings and loan association, insurance company, or
registered investment adviser, or if the employee benefit plan has total assets in excess
of $5,000,000 or, if a self-directed plan, with investment decisions made solely by
persons that are accredited investors; (2) Any private business development company as
defined in section 202(a)(22) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; (3) Any
organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, corporation,
Massachusetts or similar business trust, or partnership, not formed for the specific
purpose of acquiring the securities offered, with total assets in excess of $5,000,000; (4)
Any director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer of the securities being
offered or sold, or any director, executive officer, or general partner of a general partner
of that issuer; (5) Any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth
with that person’s spouse, exceeds $1,000,000. (i) Except as provided in paragraph
(a)(5)(ii) of this section, for purposes of calculating net worth under this paragraph
(a)(5): (A) The person’s primary residence shall not be included as an asset; (B)
Indebtedness that is secured by the person’s primary residence, up to the estimated fair
market value of the primary residence at the time of the sale of securities, shall not be
included as a liability (except that if the amount of such indebtedness outstanding at the
time of sale of securities exceeds the amount outstanding 60 days before such time,
other than as a result of the acquisition of the primary residence, the amount of such
excess shall be included as a liability); and (C) Indebtedness that is secured by the
person’s primary residence in excess of the estimated fair market value of the primary
residence at the time of the sale of securities shall be included as a liability; (ii)
Paragraph (a)(5)(i) of this section will not apply to any calculation of a person’s net
worth made in connection with a purchase of securities in accordance with a right to
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exemption allows hedge funds to raise money without limitation from an
unlimited number of accredited investors.66 The rationale behind this
exemption lies in the fact that “accredited investors” are not considered as
in need of protection as retail investors are, since they themselves are able
to assess the riskiness of the investment in hedge fund interests and are
powerful enough to obtain all of the information they want and need from
the hedge fund manager. These are the main reasons why the U.S.
legislature has considered it appropriate to exempt these kinds of offers
from the rules of the Securities Act of 1933.67
Additionally, it is worth noting that with the adoption of the Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act)68 in 2012, the U.S. legislature also
removed the solicitation ban for private companies that rely on the
Regulation D Rule 506 exemption, such as hedge funds. For a long time, in
fact, in return for the benefit of the “accredited investors offering
exemption,” private issuers such as hedge funds were largely restricted
from advertising to the general public.69 Now, consequent of this ban’s
removal, private issuers benefiting from this exemption can also engage in
advertising activities aimed at soliciting prospective (accredited)
investors.70
purchase such securities, provided that: (A) Such right was held by the person on July
20, 2010; (B) The person qualified as an accredited investor on the basis of net worth at
the time the person acquired such right; and (C) The person held securities of the same
issuer, other than such right, on July 20, 2010. (6) Any natural person who had an
individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint
income with that person’s spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a
reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year; (7) Any
trust, with total assets in excess of $5,000,000, not formed for the specific purpose of
acquiring the securities offered, whose purchase is directed by a sophisticated person as
described in § 230.506(b)(2)(ii); and (8) Any entity in which all of the equity owners
are accredited investors.
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2012).
66. See Martin, supra note 60, at 1151; see also Albiez, supra note 56, at 150; see also Sami,
supra note 11, at 282–83; Lewis, supra note 12, at 352.
67. See Ashworth, supra note 4, at 664–65; see also Schneider, supra note 14, at 272–73.
68. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7213, 7262, 77a–77g, 77r, 78c, 78k-1, 78l, 78m–78n-1, 78o, 78o-
6 (2012)).
69. See Martin, supra note 60, at 1145 (“This exclusion encompassed a wide range of both
direct and indirect communications between private issuers and prospective investors. For
example, a private issuer could lose its Rule 506 exemption by communicating any aspect of its
underlying business to the press, mentioning a fund name in an interview, or maintaining
informative websites regarding its offerings or investment strategies. As a result of this broad
interpretation, many issuers, particularly smaller and emerging companies, faced significant
hurdles in entering private markets.”).
70. See Ashworth, supra note 4, at 665; see also Martin, supra note 60, at 1145.
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B. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGEACT OF 1934
The second piece of legislation that has a potential impact on the U.S.
hedge fund industry is the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The
Securities and Exchange Act is particularly important given that it created
the SEC. Its focus is on so-called secondary market transactions, namely
transactions where one investor resells securities that it owns to another
investor. The Securities and Exchange Act states that certain companies
(referred to as publicly-traded companies) must provide the SEC with
periodic information. In particular, under Section 12(g), an issuer must
register, disclose information, and submit periodic reports if it has more
than $10 million in total assets and issues securities to 500 or more
investors who are not accredited investors or to 2000 or more accredited
investors. Although most hedge funds have total assets in excess of $10
million, many of them avoid triggering this provision by issuing securities
to fewer than 500 non-accredited investors or to fewer than 2000 accredited
investors.71
Additionally, Section 15 of the Securities and Exchange Act requires
broker-dealers to register with the SEC.72 The Securities and Exchange Act
defines a broker as any person “engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the accounts of others;” as such, hedge funds
and their managers are generally not considered brokers because they do
not effect securities transactions for the accounts of others, but rather
engage in securities transactions for their own accounts.73 On the other
hand, a dealer is defined as “any person engaged in the business of buying
and selling securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise,
but does not include a bank, or any person insofar as he buys or sells
securities for his own account, either individually or in some fiduciary
capacity, but not as a part of a regular business.” The definition of dealer
provides a “trader exception” that exempts from its coverage one who buys
and sells securities for his or her own account but not as part of a regular
business. Hedge funds and their managers usually fall within the “trader
exception,” because they trade securities on their own account, rather than
as a part of a securities business.74
C. THE INVESTMENTCOMPANYACT OF 1940
The Investment Company Act of 1940 is the most important piece of
U.S. legislation governing pooled investment vehicles such as hedge funds.
The Investment Company Act requires U.S. investment companies75 to
71. Schneider, supra note 14, at 272–74.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Gibson, supra note 4, at 692; see also Schneider supra note 14, at 274.
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (2012) (“Investment company means any issuer which— (A)
is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business
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register with the SEC.76 Most hedge funds satisfy one or both of the
requirements to be considered an investment company, as they are primarily
engaged in the business of investing and more than 40% of their assets are
invested in securities.
However, the rule imposing SEC registration has a number of
exceptions, some of which hedge funds use in order to avoid the strict
regulation and supervision arising from the Investment Company Act. First,
any investment company that is not owned by more than 100 investors and
does not plan to make a public offering of its securities is exempt.77 Hedge
funds generally do not make public offerings, so those hedge funds with
fewer than 100 investors can take advantage of this exception.78 Second, the
Investment Company Act exempts investment companies exclusively
owned by “qualified purchasers.”79 This allows hedge funds owned solely
by qualified purchasers80 to circumvent the registration requirement even if
the fund has more than 100 investors.81
of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities; (B) is engaged or proposes to engage in the
business of issuing face-amount certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such
business and has any such certificate outstanding; or (C) is engaged or proposes to engage in the
business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes
to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such
issuer’s total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated
basis.”).
76. See id. § 80a-8(a) (“Any investment company organized or otherwise created under the
laws of the United States or of a State may register for the purposes of this title by filing with the
Commission a notification of registration, in such form as the Commission shall by rules and
regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors. An investment company shall be deemed to be registered upon receipt by the
Commission of such notification of registration.”).
77. See id. § 80a-3(c)(1) (“None of the following persons is an investment company within the
meaning of this title: (1) Any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) are
beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not making and does not
presently propose to make a public offering of its securities.”).
78. See Ashworth, supra note 4, at 667.
79. Under 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)(A), none of the following persons is an investment
company within the meaning of this title: “Any issuer, the outstanding securities of which are
owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are qualified
purchasers, and which is not making and does not at that time propose to make a public offering of
such securities.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)(A).
80. See id. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A) (“‘Qualified purchaser’ means- (i) any natural person (including
any person who holds a joint, community property, or other similar shared ownership interest in
an issuer that is excepted under section 3(c)(7) with that person’s qualified purchaser spouse) who
owns not less than $5,000,000 in investments, as defined by the Commission; (ii) any company
that owns not less than $5,000,000 in investments and that is owned directly or indirectly by or for
2 or more natural persons who are related as siblings or spouse (including former spouses), or
direct lineal descendants by birth or adoption, spouses of such persons, the estates of such persons,
or foundations, charitable organizations, or trusts established by or for the benefit of such persons;
(iii) any trust that is not covered by clause (ii) and that was not formed for the specific purpose of
acquiring the securities offered, as to which the trustee or other person authorized to make
decisions with respect to the trust, and each settlor or other person who has contributed assets to
the trust, is a person described in clause (i), (ii), or (iv); or (iv) any person, acting for its own
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Avoiding the application of the Investment Company Act is of great
importance for hedge funds, because its rules would make it impossible for
their managers to perform their typical financial strategies and would make
the costs of compliance very high. In fact, under the Investment Company
Act, investment companies: (1) must comply with the SEC’s registration,
disclosure, record-keeping, and periodic reporting requirements; (2) must
enter into a written contract with the investment adviser; (3) at least 40% of
the board of directors must be disinterested directors and the shareholders
must elect at least half of the directors; (4) are prohibited from utilizing
several investment tools, such as purchasing securities on margin,
participating in joint trading accounts, effecting short sales, issuing senior
securities, or using bank and margin loans to leverage their assets more than
300%; and (5) are prohibited from effecting a number of transactions with
affiliated persons.82 This is why almost all U.S. hedge funds rely on one of
the two exemptions from the definition of investment companies under the
Investment Company Act.83
D. THE INVESTMENTADVISERSACT OF 1940
Finally, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, from a different
perspective, regulates the advisers to investment companies. Section
202(11) of the Investment Advisers Act defines an investment adviser as
“any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues
or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.”84 The main
provisions of the Investment Advisers Act contain a number of obligations
that require the advisor to:
(1) file a Form ADV with the SEC, which requires disclosures regarding
the fund’s business practices and the manager’s background, although the
manager does not have to disclose details of the fund’s investment
strategies or trades; (2) deliver basic information to clients about the
fund’s business practices and the fund manager’s background; (3) adopt
procedures governing proxy voting by the hedge fund; (4) adopt a code of
ethics; (5) develop a system of internal controls and compliance
procedures to prevent violation of the Advisers Act; (6) appoint a chief
account or the accounts of other qualified purchasers, who in the aggregate owns and invests on a
discretionary basis, not less than $25,000,000 in investments.”).
81. See Ashworth, supra note 4, at 667–68.
82. See Schneider, supra note 14, at 275–76.
83. Id.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11).
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compliance officer, and . . . [(7)] maintain specified books and records and
make them available to the SEC for examination and inspection.85
Before the adoption of Dodd-Frank in 2010, hedge fund managers
managing fewer than fifteen funds were able to avoid registration with the
SEC, taking advantage of the so-called “private fund exemption.”86
Through the enactment of Dodd-Frank, the legislature decided to remove
this exemption, with the legal effect being that currently hedge fund
managers have to register with the SEC as investment advisers if their
assets under management exceed the threshold of $150 million. In contrast,
if their assets under management are less than $150 million, advisors must
register with their state regulatory authority. All this means that hedge fund
managers with assets under management exceeding those thresholds are
now subject to federal regulation and SEC supervision.
V. THE ISSUES ARISING FROMHEDGE FUND ACTIVITY
In the recent past, due to the lack of strict regulation and supervision,
hedge funds have generated and spread systemic risk,87 while their
managers have sometimes used them to commit criminal acts mainly aimed
at defrauding investors and stealing their money.88
A. THECONCEPT OF SYSTEMICRISK
There is no unique definition of systemic risk, even if this concept is
almost always linked to cascading market failure situations.89 By
highlighting this aspect, it has been defined as the risk of chain reactions of
failures,90 also known as the “domino effect”—namely, the situation in
which the failure of an entity causes the failure of other connected entities.
Almost all of the definitions of systemic risk refer to “a trigger event, such
as an economic shock or institutional failure, [that] causes a chain of bad
85. See Schneider, supra note 14, at 277 (quoting Paredes, supra note 9, at 988–89).
86. See Krug, supra note 3, at 453 (“The rationale for the client-based exemption was that an
adviser that provides its investment advice only to a very small number of clients creates no
particular threat to the regulatory goal of ensuring the integrity of the securities markets and
arguably creates only a de minimis concern for the goal of protecting investors.”).
87. See Kaal, supra note 3, at 248; see also Ashworth, supra note 4, at 670–71.
88. See GROWTH OFHEDGE FUNDS, supra note 11, at 2, 72–73; accord Karmel, supra note 11,
at 856; see also Kaal, supra note 3, at 260; Sami, supra note 11, at 279; Jonna, supra note 11, at
1008–09.
89. See Kehoe, supra note 1, at 55–56.
90. See Rivière, supra note 2, at 292–93; see also Lee supra note 1, at 499 (defining systemic
risk as “the risk that poses a threat to the entire financial system, either (i) directly through failure
of, or significant losses in assets or liquidity to, one or more institutions, or (ii) indirectly through
the effects of such events via the operation of financial markets. This concept is consistent with
the G20’s approach to post-crisis reforms pertaining to systemically important financial
institutions and markets whose failure or severe distress may contribute to, or transmit, systemic
risk.”).
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economic consequences . . . .”91 Such consequences are significant losses,
other failures, or even market volatility and terrific downfalls of entire
financial markets. Essentially, it seems to be any large-scale default that
results in the reduced availability of capital or credit across an industry, a
market, or many different markets.92
The main sources of systemic risk are the traditional credit channel and
the market-based channel.93 In the credit market, systemic risk is inversely
correlated with credit availability. As credit availability decreases, systemic
risk increases. When credit-lending institutions start having difficulties,
they cease providing capital and liquidity to the markets. As credit and
capital become increasingly harder to find, the cost of borrowing increases,
making loans prohibitively expensive and unaffordable. If the public
perceives that a banking institution has serious liquidity problems, its
depositors could be motivated to immediately withdraw their savings,
exacerbating such problems and causing a situation called a “run on the
banks.”94 A run on the banks can easily cause the failure of such banks and
that in turn can have an impact on their creditors and counterparties, even
pushing them to the point of collapse and creating the typical domino effect.
In specific regards to the market channel, systemic risk refers to the
possibility that an abrupt and unexpected failure in one market will have an
impact on other linked markets, “due to diverse and fragmented trading
strategies and the interrelationships among large market-players.”95 In other
words, systemic risk arises from the fact that a failure in one market can
cause failures in others. In this case, the secondary markets become illiquid
because there are too many sellers and not enough buyers, and the final
result is that the markets are left in an extremely illiquid state.96
1. The Systemic Risk Issue in the Hedge Fund World: The
Creation of Systemic Risk
Those who deny that single hedge funds can generate systemic risk
usually argue that they are not systemically important financial players, as
their size is typically not very large.97 In these scholars’ opinions, hedge
funds’ failures would not pose risks able to initiate a chain of other failures
involving many other financial players.98 This argument is strongly
contradicted by what happened in 1998 to LTCM.99 In fact, this hedge fund
91. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198 (2008).
92. See generally KAMBHU ET AL., supra note 3.
93. See Lee, supra note 1, at 500–01.
94. Id. at 504.
95. See Kehoe, supra note 1, at 55–56.
96. Id.
97. See Lee, supra note 1, at 501–02; see also Kehoe, supra note 1, at 35.
98. Id.
99. See FSOC UPDATE, supra note 23, at 15 n.60; see also George & Dymally, supra note 22,
at 224–26.
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was not extremely big in terms of capital, which consisted of $5 billion.100
However, the leverage it carried was incredibly high, namely nearly twenty-
five times the value of the capital (i.e. $120 billion).101 This terrific amount
of debt caused the fund itself to become systemically relevant, given that its
failure would have hurt its investors, creditors, and counterparties, as well
as the entire market. It is irrational to deny that a $120 billion102 failure
would not be able to affect the market, generating systemic risk.103 This
very awareness moved the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to
coordinate a bailout performed by the main creditors of the fund in order to
avoid the dramatic losses that the financial markets would otherwise have
suffered.104 This bailout rescued the fund, injecting $3.6 billion, but the
investors lost the entire amount of their investments.
Such a case is particularly significant because it provides evidence that
even financial players that are not particularly big can generate systemic
risk, due to the relevant use of leverage.105 Although the LTCM case is the
most famous, there have also been other relevant hedge fund failures
highlighting their potential to pose systemic risk.106 The point is that while
100. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 227.
101. See Ashworth, supra note 4, at 670–71; see also Nelson, supra note 9, at 227.
102. See generally FSOC UPDATE, supra note 23, at 1; see also Nelson, supra note 9, at 227.
103. See Kehoe, supra note 1, at 37 (remarking that over-leveraged hedge funds can impact the
stability of the markets “depending on their [level of] liquidity and market positions”).
104. See Rivière, supra note 2, at 293 (citing Banque de France, Revue de la Stabilité
Financière, Numéro Spécial Hedge Funds, N° 10, 54 (Apr. 2007)) (“A study carried out by the
Bank of France estimates that 17 banks would have collectively lost three to five billion dollars if
LTCM had not been bailed out.”).
105. See FSOC UPDATE, supra note 23, at 14–16.
106. Kaal, supra note 3, at 245–46, 246 n.5 (underscoring the following hedge fund failures:
Amaranth, Bailey Coates, Bayou Management, Cromwell Fund, Philadelphia Alternative Asset
Management, Marin Capital, Aman Capital Global, Tiger Funds, Eifuku Master Trust, Lyceum
Capital, and Wood River Partners). In particular, after LTCM, the failures of Amaranth in 2006
and Bear Sterns hedge funds in 2007, are considered the most serious in history. See George &
Dymally, supra note 22, at 226–29 (“Another dramatic collapse occurred in September 2006 when
Amaranth Advisors lost $4.6 billion in a single week from the failure of a natural gas investment.
They were the largest hedge fund collapse in history at the time. The hedge fund launched in 2000
as a multi-strategy hedge fund operating in Greenwich, CT and had offices in the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Singapore. It has been estimated that by 2005-2006 over 80% of its profits
were from energy trading. Minimum investments in Amaranth were $5 million. Investors included
pension funds, endowments, large financial firms, insurance companies, brokerage firms, and high
net worth individuals. As was done in the LTCM failure, a congressional subcommittee reviewed
and received testimony on the overall impact of the funds collapse on the energy market and the
economy. Some of the findings of the congressional subcommittee were: Amaranth Advisors LLC
dominated the U.S. natural gas market in 2006. In August 2006, Amaranth traded natural gas
contracts on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) rather than on the New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX) so that it could trade without any restrictions on the size of its positions.
Amaranth’s actions in causing significant price movements in the natural gas market demonstrates
that excessive speculation distorts prices, increases volatility, and increases costs and risks for
natural gas consumers, such as utilities, who ultimately pass on inflated costs to their
customers. Current restraints on speculative trading to prevent manipulation and price distortions
are inadequate. It is significant that Senator Levin (D-Mich), chairman of the investigations
subcommittee, connected the implosion of Amaranth to the closing of the ‘Enron loophole’ that
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hedge funds are usually providers of liquidity to the markets, in times of
crisis they can be forced by their lenders to deleverage, particularly when
their level of debt is extremely high.107 This circumstance can contribute to
market volatility and downfall, and in significantly serious situations even
to systemic risk.108 Hedge funds are believed to pose systemic risk mostly
through the market channel due to the sophisticated, complex, and risky
investment strategies that they usually employ, quite often combining many
of these together. From an opposing viewpoint, it seems that they do not
contribute much to the creation of systemic risk through the credit
channel.109 Obviously, the impact of a fund’s default on the markets
depends on its size, leverage, and position in the markets,110 but it is evident
that if the fund is big, highly leveraged, and has a lot of interlinkages with
other financial players, its failure is much more likely to affect the market
and even to generate systemic risks.
exempts electronic energy exchanges from regulatory oversight. He also asserted that ‘[w]e need
to put the cop back on the beat in all U.S. energy markets with stronger tools to stop price
manipulation, excessive speculation, and trading abuses’ which proved to be an accurate
prediction of increased regulation for not only energy markets, but also in regard to reining in the
excessively speculative actions of all PIFs . . . . The . . . implosion of the two Bear Stearns hedge
funds in 2007 is an important PIF precursor to the tumultuous period during the time of the
collapse of global financial markets. The failure of the two funds marked the beginning of a new
era on Wall Street, although it took almost another six months for the parent corporation to fail
and more than a year for the biggest financial disaster to occur the bankruptcy of Lehman Bros.
The hedge funds had invested in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) comprised primarily of
mortgage-backed securities and had even leveraged themselves to make more investments in the
same type of CDOs. In the securitization process, the mortgages had been pooled, bundled, and
repackaged as debt securities in the form of CDOs. The CDOs included a substantial percentage
of subprime loans in the pools. Not surprisingly, when the real estate market began to unravel and
the default rate of subprime mortgage holders began to rise at an unprecedented rate, along with
other events that negatively affected the economy, the CDOs held by the Bear Stearns hedge funds
lost their value. At the time of the implosion of the two Bear Stearns funds, the parent company
was the fifth largest U.S. securities firm in terms of market value. The parent company rescued
one of its hedge funds with $3.2 billion in loans, the largest rescue of a hedge fund since LTCM.
Investors in both hedge funds were told that they would get very little of their money back.
Numerous lawsuits were filed including an SEC civil action against the top two former Bear
Stearns hedge fund managers. The jury acquitted the managers in the government’s criminal suit
and the defendants agreed on the amount that they would pay to settle the SEC action.”).
107. Kaal, supra note 3, at 248 n.13 (quoting Tobias Adrian et. al., Hedge Fund Tail Risk, in
QUANTIFYING SYSTEMIC RISK 155 (Joseph G Haubrich & Andrew W. Lo eds., 2013)).
108. Id.
109. See Kehoe, supra note 1, at 57 (“When an institution is highly leveraged and it experiences
more losses than it has surplus capital to repay, it becomes insolvent, and passes its losses on to its
lenders.”).
110. See generally Tomas Garbaravicius & Frank Dierick, Hedge Funds and Their Implications
for Financial Stability (27 Eur. Cent. Bank Occasional Paper Series, Paper No. 34, 2005), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=752094.
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a. Leverage
Leverage can be a useful component of an investment strategy.111
However, its excessive use,112 which sometimes characterizes hedge
funds,113 can represent, in combination with other factors,114 one of the most
significant sources of systemic risk, because a sequence of negative events
can start with losses on leveraged market positions.115 Liquidity shortages
are the subsequent consequence, further exacerbated by asset illiquidity in
stressed markets. This situation, if not supported by adequate liquidity
reserves or borrowing capacity, can force a fund to default on its obligations
to prime brokers and other financial institutions.
Typically, the use of leverage can result in tremendous profit if the
financial entity makes more money than its borrowing cost; conversely,
however, it can have disastrous results if the intermediary makes less than
its borrowing cost. In the event of a loss, creditors may require the fund to
provide more collateral to secure their loans, which may in turn require the
fund to sell some of its assets to meet margin calls.116 The consequent “fire
sales” of the fund’s assets can affect the market. In fact, if a highly
leveraged hedge fund has amassed numerous positions in securities of the
same kind, such tremendous sales can impact the segment of the market
where these securities are traded and even the market as a whole. It follows
that leverage is one of the main causes of systemic risk because without
debt, the likelihood of cascading failures from institution to institution
would be much lower.117
111. See FSOC UPDATE, supra note 23.
112. See Kehoe, supra note 1, at 57.
113. Gibson, supra note 4, at 686–87 (“Hedge funds typically obtain leverage through direct
financing, investment transactions such as purchasing securities on margin, taking short positions
in securities, employing collateralized borrowing through repurchase agreements (‘repos’), and
executing derivatives transactions, many of which are collateralized.”).
114. See FSOC UPDATE, supra note 23, at 15 n.108 (citing President’s Working Group on
Financial Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management
(1999)) (“The failure of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 and the liquidation of
Amaranth Advisors in 2006, both large and highly leveraged hedge funds that came under
significant stress over short periods of time with different outcomes, illustrate the interplay
between leverage, size, and other factors.”); see also Roger Ferguson & David Laster, Hedge
Funds and Systemic Risk, BANQUE DE FRANCE FIN. STABILITY REV.: SPECIAL ISSUE ON HEDGE
FUNDS, 45–54 (2007); see also Mila Getmansky, Peter Lee, & Andrew Lo, Hedge Funds: A
Dynamic Industry In Transition, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21449,
Aug. 2015).
115. See Schwarcz, supra note 91, at 222.
116. See Gibson, supra note 4, at 687.
117. See Desmet, supra note 12, at 10 (“Some large hedge funds borrow so much money to
finance their operations that an inability to meet their obligations due to sudden market reversals
could endanger the financial markets. Some hedge funds also fail as a result of excessive leverage
combined with a high concentration, which means that the fund invests all of its funds under
management in very few positions while heavily borrowing for each dollar of invested capital.”).
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b. Derivatives
Additionally, the fact that hedge funds typically invest a significant
amount of money in highly speculative derivatives,118 such as collateralized
debt obligations and credit default swaps, is considered an element that can
pose systemic risks.119 Since derivatives transactions mirror the effects of
leverage, they present a potential source of systemic risk, which is
amplified in the hedge fund industry due to high usage. “When hedge funds
default on derivatives transactions, there is potential for heightened risk
depending on the counterparty. This so-called counterparty risk is another
source of market risk because the impact of a failed derivatives transaction
depends on the counterparty’s exposure to the financial markets.”120
c. Short Selling
Short selling is one of the most controversial trading practices that
hedge funds often engage in.121 Short selling is believed to pose systemic
risk through the market channel122 and was criticized as contributing to the
2008 financial meltdown.123 At the same time, it is not likely that a single
hedge fund can impact the value of a well-performing security just by
selling it. But, a group of hedge funds that act in concert could have the
potential to depress the value of a profitable company’s share due to
combined short sales.124 Nevertheless, when a hedge fund correctly believes
that a business’s stock is overvalued, a short sale is an effective means of
price discovery that countermines inflated valuations. Additionally, a short
sale requires the hedge fund to borrow the underlying security, thereby
acting as a form of leverage, further increasing the fund’s amount of
outstanding debt.125
118. See Schneider, supra note 14, at 267 (“Derivatives are ‘financial contracts in which a
payment or delivery depends on the underlying asset, interest rate, or index’ without actually
requiring the purchase of the underlying commodity or instrument.”).
119. See George & Dymally, supra note 22, at 212–13.
120. See Kehoe, supra note 1, at 58.
121. See Gibson, supra note 4, at 685 (arguing that hedge funds have the potential to impact the
financial markets because they engage in active short-term trading); see INT’L ORG. SEC.
COMM’NS, REGULATION OF SHORT SELLING FINAL REPORT 4 (2009) (according to which “there
is also a general concern that especially in extreme market conditions, certain types of short
selling, or the use of short selling in combination with certain abusive strategies, may contribute to
disorderly markets”).
122. See FINAL IOSCO REPORT, supra note 35, at 4 (“There is also a general concern that
especially in extreme market conditions, certain types of short selling, or the use of short selling in
combination with certain abusive strategies, may contribute to disorderly markets.”).
123. See Kehoe, supra note 1, at 59.
124. See id.
125. Id.
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d. Trading Volume
Another way that hedge funds impact the markets is that they perform
half of the daily trading volume on the New York and London Stock
Exchanges.126 It is pretty obvious that in such a context they “make” the
market and therefore can both strongly impact its performance and
undermine its stability.
2. The Systemic Risk Issue in the Hedge Fund World:
Spreading Systemic Risk
Hedge funds are also able to spread systemic risk that is created by
other financial institutions;127 this is because they often are involved in
complex repo agreements and other like-bank activities.
a. Repo Agreements
A way to spread risks is through collateral rehypothecation.
Rehypothecation occurs when an intermediary, holding securities on behalf
of investors, uses these securities to obtain financing for itself.128 In the
context of the relationship between hedge funds and prime brokers,
rehypothecation is the reuse of hedge funds’ collateral by prime brokers in
transactions with other financial intermediaries completely unrelated to the
original transaction.129 Though rehypothecation provides a source of
inexpensive financing for financial institutions,130 “such a practice is
believed to be dangerous for financial stability, particularly if one looks at
how the global financial crisis manifested itself—namely as withdrawals of
collateral from investment banks such as Lehman Brothers.”131 The practice
of rehypothecation gives rise to a number of concerns, the most important
of which is systemic risk. Systemic risk originates from uncertainty
deriving from falling collateral prices and potential runs on the banks by the
firms whose collateral is being rehypothecated. A run by hedge funds might
occur because of the uncertainty of prime brokerage business when they
have rehypothecated the collateral. Unable to locate the collateral initially
posted by hedge funds to prime brokers, hedge funds fearing or
experiencing distress might suddenly run to close their position with their
126. See Martin, supra note 60, at 50.
127. See Nabilou & Pacces, supra note 3, at 212; see also Lee, supra note 1, at 502.
128. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Distorting Legal Principles, 35 J. CORP. L. 697, 699 (2010).
129. See Manmohan Singh & James Aitken, Deleveraging After Lehman-Evidence from
Reduced Rehypothecation 3 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 09/42, 2009), https://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp0942.pdf.
130. See Christian A. Johnson, Derivatives and Rehypothecation Failure: It’s 3:00 PM, Do You
Know Where Your Collateral Is?, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 949, 969 (1997).
131. See Nabilou & Pacces, supra note 3, at 232.
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prime brokers. This may cause serious distress to the prime brokers132 and,
in particularly serious situations, it can impact the markets.133
b. Like-Banks Activities
The analysis of the recent global financial crisis has also shown that
some hedge funds were involved in credit-intermediation activities by
acting as shadow-banks. In the shadow-banking context, hedge funds were
particularly active traders of complex financial instruments, such as
collateralized debt obligations.134 Additionally, they acted as credit risk
repositories in the credit intermediation chain and engaged in corporate
lending similar to banks.135 Hedge funds’ systemic risk potential in such
parallel banking sector activity lies in their numerous interconnections in
key markets, most notably the secured funding markets. This is because the
shadow banking system offers a source of financing for hedge funds via
market-based securities lending and repo transactions and through margin
lending as part of the prime broker relationship.136 Further risks arise
because hedge funds are not obliged to comply with the capital adequacy
requirements applied to banks; therefore, they are much less stable and less
resilient than banks. This means that if they engage in credit activities and
their debtors are not able to pay back the loans, they are much more likely
than banks to get in financial trouble. As usual, these problems can be
easily transmitted in turn to hedge funds’ counterparties, generating so-
called “contagion.”137
3. Regulating Hedge Funds in Order to Counteract Systemic
Risk
The global financial crisis has shown that recession is one of the most
serious consequences arising from terrific downfalls of financial markets.138
This is the main reason why all the sources of systemic risk—including
hedge funds—have to be kept under control, which means making them
subject to regulation and supervision. It follows that hedge funds’ potential
132. See FSOC UPDATE, supra note 23.
133. Id.
134. See Lee, supra note 1, at 505–06.
135. See id. at 506.
136. Id. at 508–09 (“Hedge funds are large users of repo and secured lending markets and, in
doing so, connect multiple market participants across market segments. Further, in these
transactions, prime brokers’ rehypothecation of the collateral for the borrowed securities can
create additional market risks and deepen the interconnections between the various participants in
the shadow banking system.”).
137. See FSOC UPDATE, supra note 23, at 8.
138. See Martin, supra note 60, at 59 (“Massive losses, manipulations, and abuses within the
public capital markets adversely affect the broader national economy and often precipitate
debilitating economic downturns.”).
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capability to create and spread systemic risk needs to be faced and
counteracted with the adoption of effective new rules.
B. THE INVESTOR PROTECTION ISSUE
Some recent financial scandals involving hedge funds have
demonstrated that in this sector a serious investor protection issue does
exist.139 These scandals represent the clearest evidence that this problem
exists,140 despite its denial by some commentators.141 Indeed, due to the
success of the hedge fund industry and the consequent boost in the number
of these particular vehicles, the frequency of fraud has increased
significantly.142 The reality has shown many different types of fraud
perpetrated by dishonest investment advisers and damaging their investors,
and many hedge funds and hedge fund managers have recently been in the
news for defrauding clients in a variety of ways.
1. Scandals Involving Hedge Funds
Between 1999 and 2004, the SEC brought over fifty cases charging
hedge funds and their advisers or traders with defrauding investors of a total
exceeding $1 billion.143 “Half the advisers in these cases were managing
more than $30 million or were otherwise subject to regulation” and nearly
all the investor losses were caused by the larger hedge fund advisers.144
Between January 2004 and January 2006, the SEC brought another thirty
enforcement cases against hedge funds and their advisers.145 These cases
included “allegations of misappropriation of assets, portfolio dumping,
misrepresentation of portfolio performance, falsification of experience and
past returns, misleading disclosures concerning trading strategies, and
improper asset valuation, among others.”146 Hence, the types of fraud
perpetrated in the recent past by investment advisers in the hedge fund
139. See GROWTH OFHEDGE FUNDS, supra note 11.
140. See id.; accord Karmel, supra note 11, at 862–63 (“Abuses and insolvencies by some
hedge funds have demonstrated that investor protection is an issue.”); see also Kaal, supra note 3,
at 245; Jonna, supra note 11, at 1008–09.
141. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 222, 229–30, 240; Gibson, supra note 4, at 713–14; Kaal,
supra note 3, at 250–51.
142. See generally GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 11 (describing the fraudulent
conduct of hedge fund managers); Kaal, supra note 3, at 245 (underscoring that the amount of
fraud has increased as a result of the increasing access to hedge funds by retail investors); see
Lewis, supra note 12, at 363 (“Recent increases in the number of reports of fraud committed by
hedge funds could be indicative of wider, unreported fraud in the industry.”).
143. See Sami, supra note 11, at 279; see also Lewis, supra note 12, at 365.
144. See Desmet, supra note 12, at 31.
145. Francesco Guerrera, Andrew Parker & Stephen Schurr, Deadline Approaches As SEC
Takes Clippers to Hedge Funds, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2006, at 26.
146. See Desmet, supra note 12, at 31 (quoting Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain
Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,062–63 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
275 and 279)).
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industry vary from: (1) exaggeration of the fund’s past performance;147 (2)
misappropriation and stealing148 of the fund’s assets for personal use;149 (3)
“fabrication” of false audit reports;150 (4) misrepresentation of the fund’s
returns and performance;151 (5) Ponzi scheme conduct;152 (6)
misrepresentation of the fund’s investment positions;153 and (7)
overvaluation and undervaluation of the fund’s assets.154
147. See Jacob Preiserowicz, Note, The New Regulatory Regime for Hedge Funds: Has the SEC
Gone Down the Wrong Path?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 807, 836–37 (2006); Desmet,
supra note 12, at 32 (describing the scandal known as the Bayou Funds, where “[i]n late
September 2005, the Commission charged Bayou and its management with fraud, alleging that
they had attracted investors by exaggerating Bayou’s performance”); see generally Complaint,
SEC v. Samuel Israel III, (S.D.N.Y 2005) [hereinafter Complaint]; Press Release, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, SEC Charges Samuel Israel III, Daniel E. Marino, Bayou Management, and Bayou
Funds for Defrauding Hedge Fund Investors and Misappropriating Investor Assets (Sept. 29,
2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-139.htm [hereinafter SEC Charges Samuel Israel III].
148. See Desmet, supra note 12, at 34 (“The Commission . . . charged the manager of Bingham
Growth Partners L.P. with fraud for misleading investors concerning his fund’s returns and for
stealing from the fund’s assets. He allegedly raised at least $460,000 from investors using fake
returns.”); see also Order, In the Matter of Barry Alan Bingham (No. 3012015),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-52318-o.pdf; see Atlanta Man Accused of Hedge Fund
Scam, CNNMONEY (Aug. 24, 2005, 10:19 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/24/markets/hedge
fund_sec/.
149. See Desmet, supra note 12, at 32 (dealing with the Bayou Funds scandal and underscoring
that “[t]he Commission charged Bayou and its management with fraud, alleging that they . . . had
misappropriated millions of dollars in investors funds for their personal use.”); see Complaint,
supra note 147; SEC Charges Samuel Israel III, supra note 147.
150. See Desmet, supra note 12, at 32 (emphasizing that in the Bayou scandal “Bayou had
claimed that its books had been reviewed by independent auditors when in fact they were certified
by an accounting firm whose registered agent was none other than Bayou’s chief financial officer.
That accounting firm allegedly fabricated ‘independent’ audit reports to buy Bayou some time to
make up its huge losses.”); see Complaint, supra note 147; SEC Charges Samuel Israel III, supra
note 147.
151. See Desmet, supra note 12, at 32 (underscoring that in the Bayou Funds scandal, “the
Commission alleged that Bayou overstated its 2003 performance by claiming over $43 million in
net gain from investment transactions even though trading records in fact showed a $49 million
loss during that period of time”); see Complaint, supra note 147; SEC Charges Samuel Israel III,
supra note 147.
152. See Desmet, supra note 12, at 34 (arguing that some funds involved in the cases enforced
by the SEC had never traded. For example, HMC International, LLC was charged for being just a
Ponzi scheme. The fund raised more than $5.2 million without trading for months. Similarly, the
offshore fund, The Pembridge Group, was sued by the SEC which alleged it did not even exist);
see Gregory Zuckerman, SEC Charges Hedge-Fund HMC Principals of Fraud, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
22, 2005, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113521812045129147; HMC Int’l, LLC,
et al., SEC Litigation Release 19508, SEC (Dec. 21, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/lr19508.htm; Jenny Anderson, S.E.C. Accuses a New Jersey Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 22, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/22/business/sec-accuses-a-new-jersey-hedge-
fund.html; Treyton L. Thomas, et al., SEC Litigation Release 18957, SEC (Nov. 3, 2004),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18957.htm.
153. See Desmet, supra note 12, at 32–33 (“In October 2005, the Commission announced it was
filing a lawsuit against Wood River Partners LP, Wood River Partners Offshore Ltd., and John
Whittier, the funds’ manager. The Commission alleged that Whittier made material
misrepresentations regarding the oversight and diversification of the two hedge funds in question.
Contrary to representations in offering materials concerning diversification, the funds had
amassed a huge position in a single small-cap stock.”); see also SEC Hits Wood River Hedge
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2. The Need for Investor Protection in the Hedge Fund Sector
The argument that investors who can invest in hedge funds do not need
to be protected by regulation, since they are considered able to fend for
themselves,155 certainly does not make the investor protection issue a false
or merely theoretical problem. At best, this argument could be used to say
that, even if the problem exists, there is no need to address it by enhancing
regulation and supervision because hedge fund investors can manage it
themselves. However, even this interpretation cannot be shared because it
represents the implicit admission that such funds can potentially hurt their
investors even if they are theoretically able to protect themselves, thanks to
their financial skills and their wealth. It is also worth noting that it is no
longer true that only sophisticated, wealthy, and/or institutional investors
are allowed to invest in hedge funds. In fact, due to so-called “retailization,”
today investors who are not sophisticated, wealthy, or institutional can buy
hedge fund interests. In other words, this phenomenon is represented by the
possibility that even investors neither particularly sophisticated nor very
wealthy can potentially invest in hedge funds.156 This can happen in
different ways, both directly and indirectly.
Funds with Fraud Suit, N.Y. POST (Oct. 14, 2005); see Complaint, SEC v. Wood River Capital
Management, LLC et al., (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
154. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, STAFF
REPORT TO THE U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 99 (2003), https://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.extra/hedgestudyfacts.htm (In that report, the staff
recommended that the Commission “should consider requiring, through rulemaking, that all
registered investment companies that invest their assets in hedge funds, including registered
[funds of hedge funds], have policies and procedures designed to ensure that funds and their
boards value their interests in hedge funds in a manner consistent with the requirements of the
Investment Company Act.”); Sami, supra note 11, at 288 (stating that one of the problems is
connected to the way in which hedge fund advisers value the assets of their funds due to the lack
of independence in the assessment process. This issue is serious as it can also impact the
registered funds investing in hedge funds as they are not in a position to properly value their
investments); see Desmet, supra note 12, at 34 (stating that Critical Infrastructure Fund falsely
raised the value of its assets and Global Money Management, L.P. was alleged to have told the
investors that its assets were worth nearly $100 million whilst the real value, according to the
SEC, was around $11 million); see also Chad Bray, SEC Sues Former Hedge Fund Manager,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2005, 3:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112793030746554717;
SEC v. Joseph W. Daniel, SEC Litigation Release No. 19427 (Oct. 13, 2005); SEC v. Global
Money Management, L.P. et al., SEC Litigation Release No. 18666 (Apr. 12, 2004).
155. This is the position of some commentators. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 222, 230, 240;
Gibson, supra note 4, at 713–14; Kaal, supra note 3, at 250.
156. See Sami, supra note 11, at 279 (underscoring the growing exposure of smaller,
unsophisticated investors to hedge funds); Jonna, supra note 11, at 1007 (“Through a process
referred to as ‘retailization,’ hedge funds are made available to average small investors.”); Kaal,
supra note 3, at 245; see also Desmet, supra note 12, at 8–9 (explaining that due to this
phenomenon called retailization, many non-wealthy investors have started to invest in hedge
funds); see also Lewis, supra note 12, at 363 (“The retailization of hedge funds unduly exposes
unqualified investors to the risks hedge funds pose, through ineffective minimum investor
requirements and increased participation by mainstream investment vehicles like pension funds.”).
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3. The Shortcomings of the Sophisticated Investor Doctrine and
the Effect of Inflation
First, the thresholds used to classify wealthy people as “accredited
investors,”157 who are allowed to invest in hedge funds, are no longer very
high due to inflation.158 In fact, it is difficult to argue that investors with
$200,000 of income per year159 are wealthy enough to protect themselves
from the fraud or misappropriation that can be carried out by hedge fund
managers.160 Certainly this income does not make them sophisticated or
wealthy enough to benefit from significant technical skills allowing them to
properly assess and value the behavior of their hedge fund manager on an
ongoing basis, in order to find out if some irregularities have been taking
place. Nevertheless, arguably this level of income is deemed as adequate to
consider a person as an “accredited investor,” who for this reason is allowed
to invest in hedge funds.161
This issue is magnified by the fact that usually hedge funds are rather
opaque financial vehicles, meaning that typically their managers do not
157. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15) (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2013).
158. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 239 (“Currently accredited investors include those that earn
over $200,000 a year or have over $1 million in net worth. These numbers were formulated over
twenty years ago and are outdated. The number of people meeting this threshold has increased
significantly because of inflation. Thus, those eligible to invest in hedge funds are more in number
and less wealthy than those of twenty years ago in real terms.”); see also Lewis, supra note 12, at
364 (“As inflation has increased and segments of the population have become wealthier, the
restrictions on the level of investor that can invest in hedge funds have become outdated.
Specifically, the definition of accredited investor has not changed even though the real value of
the required minimum assets has decreased. For example, the recent stock market boom has left
many investors with the requisite net worth and capital to nominally qualify as investors in hedge
funds, despite the fact that their actual qualifications to do so have not changed. As a result, many
investors who previously could not invest in hedge funds are now becoming investors. The SEC
believes that the availability of hedge funds to the ‘merely affluent’ exposes too many otherwise
unqualified investors to potential losses that could cripple their finances. In other words, the
‘merely affluent’ investor might invest in a hedge fund without fully understanding or
appreciating the risks involved, due in part to the limited disclosure required of the hedge fund.”);
see also Preiserowicz, supra note 147, at 841; Erik J. Greupner, Hedge Funds are Headed Down-
Market: A Call for Increased Regulation?, 40 SANDIEGO L. REV. 1555, 1576 (2003).
159. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6) (2013) (noting that a natural person with income exceeding
$200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with a spouse exceeding $300,000
for those years and a reasonable expectation of the same income level in the current year is
considered as an accredited investor).
160. It is worth noting that even if investors with income of $200,000 USD per year are
considered accredited investors and, as such, eligible to invest in hedge funds, most managers
prefer to limit the offering of their funds’ units to richer investors in order to benefit from the
other exemptions and exceptions of U.S. securities laws. For a different interpretation see Lewis,
supra note 12, at 379–80 (arguing that some newly established hedge funds are trying to target
accredited investors. For this reason, according to the commentator’s point of view, the SEC
should revise the definition of “accredited investors.”).
161. See Martin, supra note 60, at 56 (“[I]n order to uphold investor protection as a viable
mechanism for maintaining the integrity of the markets, the assumptions that support the
sophisticated investor exemption must be consistently reexamined by both researchers and
regulators.”).
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disclose much information to the investors.162 The commentators who do
not consider that as an issue argue that the investors can negotiate the
conditions of their participation with their hedge fund manager, including
the type and the amount of information that the manager must provide
them.163 Even if that could be theoretically true, it is appropriate to
emphasize that investors with $200,000 of income per year do not have
such bargaining power in negotiating with the hedge fund manager,
because, presumably, the amount of money that they can invest is not so
relevant to the manager.
Further, most hedge funds rely on the so-called “qualified purchasers
exemption” under Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940
to avoid the application of its rules. Consequently, only natural persons
owning not less than $5 million in investments can buy their securities.
Even though a natural person owning that amount of investments is
supposed to be richer than a natural person with $200,000 of income per
year, under the definition of accredited investor it is not certain that such a
natural person is also much more sophisticated and able to properly
understand and assess this kind of investment. As a result, both these
categories of investors are likely to be “unarmed” in relation to their hedge
fund managers.
4. Funds of Hedge Funds
In recent times, funds of hedge funds have become rather popular.164
These are investment companies that are specialized in investing in hedge
funds, but their main feature is that even retail investors can buy their units
or shares.165 This means that retail investors can easily invest in hedge
funds—even if indirectly—through such funds of funds. It is obvious that
162. See Rivière, supra note 2, at 265.
163. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 240 (arguing that sophisticated investors have the power to
control hedge fund managers due to the fact they can threaten to redeem huge amounts of capital).
164. See Lewis, supra note 12, at 358 (“Funds of funds are hedge funds that invest solely in
other hedge funds. Funds of funds are gaining popularity because they provide access to
investments in a variety of supposedly carefully selected, well performing hedge funds and have a
diversifying effect on portfolios. Further, funds of funds require relatively low investment
minimums because most funds of funds are registered as closed-end investment companies under
the ICA and are not limited in number of investors. Investors in such funds, however, must still be
considered accredited investors or qualified purchasers to comply with exemptions that allow for
the charging of performance fees.”); Laura Edwards, Looking Through the Hedges: How the SEC
Justified its Decision to Require Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 603,
611 (2005); Rory B. O’Halloran, An Overview and Analysis of Recent Interest in Increased Hedge
Fund Regulation, 79 TUL. L. REV. 461, 470 (2004); Desmet, supra note 12, at 9 (“U.S. funds of
hedge funds that are registered with the Commission as investment companies do not require that
investors be accredited and accept investments as small as $25,000.”); see also Nelson, supra note
9, at 221 (“Funds that invest in other hedge funds to spread risk, called funds of funds, have
increased hedge fund accessibility for those who do not meet the investment thresholds traditional
hedge funds usually require.”).
165. See Lewis, supra note 12, at 358; Edwards, supra note 164, at 611–12.
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investment companies are institutional investors.166 As such, presumably,
they can benefit from the financial skills of their managers, which in turn
means they should be able to properly assess the quality and the honesty of
the hedge fund managers as well as the hedge funds in which they invest.
Furthermore, typically their assets under management are significant and
this factor should give them much more bargaining power in their
relationship with the hedge fund managers, allowing them to obtain all
necessary information.
Nevertheless, from the opposite point of view, the increasing popularity
of this type of fund creates the opportunity for a growing number of retail
investors to indirectly invest in hedge funds. This circumstance “swallows”
the meaning of the wealth thresholds, which are used to define both
accredited investors and qualified purchasers. In fact, by introducing these
thresholds, the legislature has intended to allow only investors who are
above them to invest in hedge funds, while through funds of hedge funds
these thresholds are practically circumvented, since the money of retail
investors is indirectly used to buy hedge fund securities. Consequently,
from a practical perspective, the assumption that hedge fund investors are
only sophisticated, wealthy, and/or institutional has begun to have an
increasing number of exceptions.
5. Pension Funds, Retirement Funds and Pension Plans
Investing in Hedge Funds
That pension funds, retirement funds, and pension plans have been
investing a tremendous and growing amount of money in hedge funds
further demonstrates that it is no longer true that only sophisticated,
wealthy, and/or institutional investors are allowed to invest in hedge
funds.167 In this regard, the aspect to take into consideration is that the
money they invest is the money of workers that will have to be given back
to them after their retirement. Given that these pension funds, retirement
funds, and pension plans manage the money of workers who can be mainly
166. Likewise, banks and insurance companies, even registered investment companies, are
considered accredited investors. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15) (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. §
230.501(a) (2013).
167. See Jonna, supra note 11, at 993 (“[P]ension funds, the largest institutional investors,
which invest retirees’ money, are increasingly investing those assets in hedge funds to boost
returns. The number of U.S. corporate defined-benefit pension funds investing in hedge funds has
been increasing throughout the last several years, and the percentage is expected to continue
increasing.”); see also Lewis, supra note 12, at 363–64 (“Pension funds and other retirement
investment vehicles, which are available to the public at large, increasingly invest in hedge funds.
Pension fund managers are under pressure to provide handsome returns to ensure comfortable nest
eggs for millions of employees in both the public and private sectors. As a result, pension fund
managers are lured by hedge funds’ historically outsized returns and promises of non-correlation
with the wider investment environment. Also attractive to pension fund managers are the
diversifying effects of hedge funds on investment portfolios.”).
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classified as retail investors, it is possible to argue that in this way retail
investors indirectly invest in hedge funds.
There is no doubt that pension funds, retirement funds, and pension
plans are institutional investors with managers who have sophisticated
financial skills, making them able to assess and carefully check the hedge
fund managers’ behavior and the hedge fund performance on an ongoing
basis. However, what recently happened to some huge retirement funds
should encourage serious reflection on the risks arising from hedge fund
managers’ bad behavior and their potential to harm retired people, who
certainly are not necessarily sophisticated, wealthy, or institutional
investors.168 Further, the previous argument regarding funds of hedge funds
is also true for pension funds. In fact, allowing pension funds to invest the
money of workers and retired people in hedge funds causes the same
circumvention of the thresholds laid down in the definitions of accredited
investors and qualified purchasers. The reason for these thresholds is that
natural persons who are considered as relatively wealthy are allowed to
make riskier investments; due to their economic condition, they can take a
risk to lose the money they have invested. Obviously, this argument cannot
be used for pension funds, so it would be appropriate to reflect about the
legislative consistency between the use of these thresholds to allow
investments in hedge funds and the fact that pension funds invest a huge
amount of workers’ and retired people’s money in these risky financial
vehicles.
6. Why Would Sophisticated, Wealthy, and Institutional
Investors Not Deserve Protection?
The fact that an investor is sophisticated, wealthy, and/or institutional
does not automatically mean that they can avoid being defrauded by their
hedge fund manager.169 In fact, it is rather difficult, even for investors who
have these features, to stop managers’ illegal or unethical conduct, as many
recent scandals have proven.170 These features are just the ex ante
demonstration that the investor is considered able to assess and take the
financial risks arising from a risky investment. On the contrary, however,
168. See Jonna, supra note 11, at 993–94, 1018 (“Some pension funds have lost substantial
amounts of retirees’ money by investing in hedge funds, such as the San Diego County Retirement
fund, which lost $100 million after Amaranth Advisers collapsed in 2006 . . . . The San Diego
Employees’ Retirement Association has alleged that the hedge fund repeatedly misled it about its
strategies and activities in the marketplace.”).
169. See Martin, supra note 60, at 51 (“Many wealthy people, pension trustees and portfolio
managers turned out to be just as incompetent as any amateur. This is a group of people defined
by statute as ‘accredited’ or ‘sophisticated’ investors. The farce is that there is no test, license[,] or
registration required to be ‘accredited’ as a ‘sophisticated’ investor.”).
170. See GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 11, at 2–3; accord Karmel, supra note 11, at
862–63 (“Abuses and insolvencies by some hedge funds have demonstrated that investor
protection is an issue.”); see also Kaal, supra note 3, at 244; Sami, supra note 11, at 279; Jonna,
supra note 11, at 1008.
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the possession of these characteristics is not enough to make the investors
able to prevent or protect themselves from fraud committed by the fund
managers, as the Madoff scandal demonstrated.171 Although Madoff was
neither a hedge fund manager nor a hedge fund, but rather was just a
broker-dealer, it is difficult to deny that the same scandal could also occur
in the hedge fund sector. Therefore, this case represents the best evidence
that investment advisers can defraud even wealthy, sophisticated, and/or
institutional investors, despite their financial skills and economic status.172
7. Regulating Hedge Funds in Order to Protect Their Investors
It is clear from the above arguments that the investor protection issue
should be seriously considered. In addition, new rules aimed at avoiding the
possibility of such situations occurring again in the future should be taken
into consideration.
VI. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF NEW RULES APPLIED TO HEDGE
FUNDMANAGERS
Dodd-Frank was passed mainly in response to the global financial
crisis; in 2010, the U.S. legislature passed Dodd-Frank with the aim to
better monitor and address systemic risks. The Dodd-Frank Act also claims
to aim to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, such
as fraud and other misconduct performed by financial intermediaries, such
as hedge fund managers. Regarding the hedge fund industry, the main
measure adopted by Dodd-Frank to reach its legislative goals in Title IV,
named PFIARA,173 has been to oblige managers of private funds174 with
assets under management above $150 million to register with the SEC
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, in the same way as the
investment advisers to registered investment companies. PFIARA
introduced the duty of registration with the SEC for such investment
advisers by removing from the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 the
exemption allowing a manager managing fewer than fifteen funds to avoid
171. George & Dymally, supra note 22, at 230 n.130 (In the Madoff scandal, “[m]any of the
Madoff depositaries were located in Luxembourg where the laws were more lenient than in some
of the other Member States. Madoff used the depositaries in the perpetration of his fraud because
the ‘banks and others that were supposed to be safeguarding the assets of Madoff-related funds . . .
had in fact delegated their responsibility for the assets to Mr. Madoff.”).
172. See Martin, supra note 60, at 52 (underscoring that the Madoff case “resulted in over $20
billion in aggregate losses to wealthy and institutional investors. This scandal was riddled with
distressing stories of prosperous individuals who had little to no financial acumen losing their
entire fortunes to Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. In many cases, instead of doing their due diligence,
these investors simply relied on Madoff’s reputation for guaranteeing high returns and attracting
other prominent investors.”).
173. PFIARA is an acronym for Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act.
174. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(29) (2012) (“The term ‘private fund’ means an issuer that would
be an investment company, as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15
U.S.C. 80a–3), but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act.”).
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the registration requirement.175 Obviously, registration with the SEC makes
these managers subject to the rules of the Investment Advisers Act and to
the supervision of the SEC itself.
Further, Dodd-Frank created the Financial Services Oversight Council
(FSOC) and granted it the task of monitoring the financial industry for
systemic risks.176 It also introduced the so-called Volcker Rule, which
prohibits proprietary trading and banking entities’ investments in and
sponsorship of hedge funds and private equity funds. The aims of these
provisions are: (1) addressing problems arising from hedge fund
interconnectedness with large complex financial institutions (LCFIs); (2)
preventing cross-subsidization of private funds by depository institutions
having access to explicit and implicit government guarantees; and (3)
regulation of conflicts of interest in the relationship between banks, their
customers, and private funds.177
A. REGISTRATIONWITH THE SEC AND THEOBLIGATION TO
DISCLOSEDATA AND INFORMATION
The Dodd-Frank Act mandates hedge fund adviser registration in order
to increase record keeping and disclosure.178 The threshold taken into
consideration for SEC registration is $100 million. However, pursuant to a
rule that the SEC adopted under the Dodd-Frank Act, an adviser that
manages only private funds, such as a hedge fund, need not register with the
SEC if its assets under management are below $150 million—again, as long
as the adviser is otherwise subject to regulation by the relevant state or
states.179 Hedge fund advisers obliged to register with the SEC have to file
175. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571–74 (2010)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2012)) (providing the exemptions for hedge fund
adviser registration under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
176. See Ashworth, supra note 4, at 683.
177. See Hossein Nabilou, Addressing Interconnectedness of Hedge Funds with Large Complex
Financial Institutions: Is the Volcker Rule Panacea? (Ludwig Maximilians Universität München,
Working Paper, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=2329335.
178. See FSOC UPDATE, supra note 23 (The Council emphasizes that “[t]he financial crisis of
2007-2009 demonstrated the need for clear accountability for the stability of the U.S. financial
system. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)
established the Financial Stability Oversight Council (Council) to bring together, for the first time,
the financial regulatory community to identify and respond to emerging threats to financial
stability. Consistent with its mandate, the Council monitors all sectors of the financial services
marketplace to identify potential threats to U.S. financial stability and, where appropriate, takes
steps to address those threats.”).
179. See Krug, supra note 3, at 454 (“An adviser that manages one hedge fund with three
investors and, separately, the assets held by three individuals in three separate brokerage accounts
is subject to the $100 million threshold. However, if those individuals instead placed their account
assets in the hedge fund, the $150 million threshold would apply.”); see also Kaal, supra note 3, at
264–65 (“The Dodd-Frank Act created the category of ‘mid-sized investment advisers.’ A
midsized adviser is generally defined as an investment adviser with between $25 and $100 million
USD in AUM that is subject to registration and examinations with the state in which it maintains
its principal office and place of business. Dodd-Frank delegates responsibility for midsized
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the Form ADV and Form PF.180 The data collected by the SEC through
Form ADV is important in order to protect investors and assess the risks
posed by investment advisers.181 This form is made up of two parts. Part 1
mainly concerns information about the investment adviser’s business,
ownership, clients, employees, business practices, affiliations, and any
disciplinary events the adviser or its employees have experienced. Part 2 is
divided into two sections, A and B, both of which are intended for
distribution to the investors. Part 2A is called the brochure and must contain
information regarding the investment adviser’s business, funds managed,
conflicts of interest, and risks in the investment strategies. Part 2B is the
brochure supplement and focuses on the advisory personnel employed by
the fund advisers.182
All of the information disclosed under Form ADV is fully available to
the public.183 In contrast, the data collected by the SEC through Form PF is
used mainly to assess the systemic risks posed by hedge funds, and remains
confidential due to its proprietary and sensitive nature. However, this
information can be shared by the SEC with other agencies, such as FSOC.
Given that smaller financial vehicles typically are less likely to pose
relevant systemic risks, the SEC requires hedge fund advisers to provide
different kinds of information on the basis of their assets under
management. So hedge fund advisers with assets under management
between $150 million and $1.5 billion (so-called small private fund
advisers) have to file just Section 1 of Form PF, while hedge fund advisers
with assets under management over $1.5 billion (so-called large private
fund advisers) have to file both Sections 1 and 2 of Form PF.184
Section 1 is divided into three subsections: (1) subsection 1A requires
registered hedge fund advisers to provide basic information about any
hedge funds they manage; (2) subsection 1B asks for more detailed
information about each fund, such as each fund’s gross and net assets, the
aggregate value of its derivatives positions, and its use of leverage;185 (3)
investment advisers away from the SEC to state regulatory authorities. Midsized advisers that do
not fall under the SEC registration requirements are instead required to register with the state
securities commissioner or similar agency in the state of their principle place of business. In some
states, however, registered advisers are not subject to examination. The SEC will oversee
midsized advisers in those states that will not provide appropriate oversight.”).
180. See Kaal, supra note 3, at 264 (emphasizing that even “advisers with less than $150
million AUM have to maintain records and provide the SEC with annual reports or any other
reports that the SEC deems appropriate or necessary to protect investors”).
181. See Ashworth, supra note 4, at 687.
182. See Kehoe, supra note 1, at 64–65.
183. See id.; Ashworth, supra note 4, at 687.
184. See Ashworth, supra note 4, at 689–91 (“The SEC estimates that the $1.5 billion threshold
will capture ‘over 80% of the U.S. hedge fund industry.’”).
185. This subsection also asks for the percentage of the funds equity held by the five largest
equity holders. It is designed to allow the FSOC to monitor certain systemic risks for the broader
private fund industry.
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subsection 1C gathers data on each separate hedge fund managed by the
adviser, such as “each fund’s investment strategies and the percentage of
the fund’s assets managed using high-frequency trading strategies.”186
Section 2 of Form PF187 is aimed at gathering further data concerning
“relevant areas of financial activity that have the potential to raise systemic
concerns.” Under Section 2A, large private investment advisers are required
to give very detailed reports on the value of “assets invested (on a short and
long basis) in different types of securities and commodities (e.g., different
types of equities, fixed income securities, derivatives, and structured
products).”188 Section 2B requires further disclosure on each separate hedge
fund managed with a net asset value over $500 million at the end of any
month in the prior fiscal quarter. Advisers must disclose information such
as portfolio liquidity, large institutional positions, posting of collateral by
counterparties, leverage, and internal risk assessments. Large private fund
advisers have to report this data every three months, while small private
fund advisers are required to do so just once per year.189 After collecting all
this information, the SEC gives this data to FSOC, which in turn uses it to
monitor the hedge fund activities and analyze the generation and spreading
of systemic risks.190
B. THE INVESTMENTADVISERSACT OF 1940 COMPLIANCERULES
Due to the fact that registered investment advisers are subject to the
rules of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, now even hedge fund
managers “must adopt a detailed compliance network with procedures that
are ‘reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Act itself.’” For this
reason they “must employ a competent chief compliance officer to oversee
all the compliance activities . . . formulate a code of ethics [as well as]
procedures to prevent insider trading, client privacy policies, and
substantive proxy voting standards.”191
186. In addition, advisers have to identify each hedge fund’s top trading counterparties and
information on trading and clearing practices. Section 1C is designed to enable FSOC to monitor
systemic risk that could be transmitted through counterparty exposure, track how different trading
strategies are affected by and correlated with market stresses, and follow the extent of private fund
activities conducted away from regulated exchanges and clearing systems.
187. This section must only be filed by large private fund advisers.
188. This should help the FSOC monitor different asset classes typically held by hedge funds
and show trends in hedge funds’ exposures.
189. See Mark D. Flood, Philip Monin & Lina Bandyopadhyay, Gauging Form PF: Data
Tolerances in Regulatory Reporting on Hedge Fund Risk Exposures 8 (Office of Fin. Research,
Working Paper No. 15-13, 2015); Ashworth, supra note 4, at 691 (“Small Private Fund Advisers
of hedge funds have to report less information, less frequently, than Large Private Fund Advisers.
This is because, from a systemic risk monitoring perspective, the SEC does not think additional
information or more frequent reporting is justified for hedge funds smaller than $1.5 billion.”).
190. See Flood, Monin & Bandyopadhyay, supra note 189, at 6.
191. See Kehoe, supra note 1, at 46–47.
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C. THE SEC’SANTI-FRAUDRULE
After the failed attempt to impose the mandatory registration of hedge
fund managers in 2004,192 the SEC adopted an anti-fraud rule in 2007 that
applied to all investment advisers, regardless of their registration with the
SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.193 Rule 206(4)-8(a)(1) of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 prohibits investment advisers,
including those advising hedge funds, from making false or misleading
statements to investors or otherwise defrauding them.194 In addition, the rule
specifies that the SEC can bring enforcement actions against investment
advisers who defraud current or prospective investors in hedge funds.195
The introduction of this rule can be considered a legislative response to
the many financial scandals involving hedge fund managers who were not
registered with the SEC.196 In fact, when such a rule was introduced in
2007, hedge fund managers used to avoid the application of the Investment
Adviser Act of 1940 due to the private fund exemption. Thus, to deal with
this situation, the SEC determined that this rule had (and still has) to apply
to both registered and non-registered investment advisers.
D. THE SEC’SCUSTODYRULE
Under the Investment Advisers Act, every hedge fund manager now
“shall take such steps to safeguard client assets over which such adviser has
custody, including, without limitation, verification of such assets by an
independent public accountant, as the Commission may, by rule,
prescribe.”197 In order to counteract managers’ acts of misappropriation and
stealing of fund assets, the SEC in 2010 issued a new version of the so-
called “custody rule.”198 This rule mandates investment advisers to involve
a qualified custodian in the asset management service, in order to safe keep
client funds and securities. Qualified custodians are mainly banks and
192. See Bines & Thel, supra note 15, at 152–55.
193. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 17 C.F.R. pt. 275
(2007).
194. See Albiez, supra note 56, at 168; see also Ashworth, supra note 4, at 678–79 (“The SEC
noted that it ‘would not need to demonstrate that an adviser violating [the Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud
Rule] acted with scienter [(knowledge or intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.’]. The SEC
decided that using a negligence standard for determining the liability of fraudster hedge fund
advisers is appropriate under the Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule.); see also Kaal, supra note 3, at
251 n.23 (quoting Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72
Fed. Reg. 44,756, 44,757 (Aug. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275)) (“The rule clarifies
that an adviser’s duty to refrain from fraudulent conduct under the federal securities laws extends
to the relationship with ultimate investors and that the Commission may bring enforcement actions
under the Advisers Act against investment advisers who defraud investors or prospective investors
in those pooled investment vehicles.”).
195. See Sami, supra note 11, at 296.
196. See Lewis, supra note 12, at 363–68; Sami, supra note 11, at 296; Desmet, supra note 12,
at 24–25.
197. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-18b (2012).
198. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (2010).
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brokers-dealers registered under section 15(b)(1) of the Securities and
Exchange Act. If the investment adviser is a broker-dealer registered under
the Securities and Exchange Act, it can act as a qualified custodian with
regard to the funds that it manages (so-called self-custody).199 The rule also
defines the concept of custody by emphasizing that it “means holding,
directly or indirectly, client funds or securities, or having any authority to
obtain possession of them.”200
The qualified custodian has to maintain the client fund and securities
“[i]n a separate account for each client under that client’s name, or [i]n
accounts that contain only its clients’ funds and securities, under [its] name
as agent or trustee for the clients”201 and has to send “an account statement,
at least quarterly, to each . . . client for which it maintains funds or
securities, identifying the amount of funds and type of each security in the
account at the end of the period and setting forth all transactions in the
account during that period.”202 Even more importantly, under the same rule
the client funds and securities have to be “verified by actual examination at
least once during each calendar year . . . by an independent public
accountant, pursuant to a written agreement, . . . without prior notice or
announcement” to the manager.203
It is worth noting that even before 2010 there was an SEC rule
mandating investment advisers to involve a custodian to safe keep the
client’s assets. The problem at that time was mainly the fact that hedge fund
advisers usually escaped the application of the Investment Advisers Act
altogether, benefiting from the private fund exemption, which allowed them
to also avoid the application of the SEC’s custody rule. Given that the
custody rule now applies to all registered hedge fund managers, the level of
investor protection seems to be slightly increased compared to the past.
VII. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF U.S. REGULATION
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 made clear how financial
markets are interconnected and how financial entities, also benefiting from
199. See id. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(6).
200. See id. § 275.206(4)-2 (“You have custody if a related person holds, directly or indirectly,
client funds or securities, or has any authority to obtain possession of them, in connection with
advisory services you provide to clients. Custody includes: (i) Possession of client funds or
securities (but not of checks drawn by clients and made payable to third parties) unless you
receive them inadvertently and you return them to the sender promptly but in any case within
three business days of receiving them; (ii) Any arrangement (including a general power of
attorney) under which you are authorized or permitted to withdraw client funds or securities
maintained with a custodian upon your instruction to the custodian; and (iii) Any capacity (such as
general partner of a limited partnership, managing member of a limited liability company or a
comparable position for another type of pooled investment vehicle, or trustee of a trust) that gives
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lack of regulation and supervision, can easily generate and spread systemic
risk. Even if hedge funds were not considered the cause of the financial
crisis, they played a significant role in transmitting systemic risks from the
U.S. financial markets—where they mostly operated—to the markets of
other countries. Additionally, a number of financial scandals involving the
U.S. hedge fund industry have shown how advisers can use these financial
vehicles to defraud their investors in a variety of ways. The U.S. legislative
response to both of these issues was the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act in
2010, particularly Title IV (PFIARA), which is focused on the investment
advisers to private funds such as hedge funds.
However, although Dodd-Frank was adopted in order “to promote the
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from
abusive financial services practices . . . .”204 it is not certain whether the
new provisions concerning hedge fund managers will be enough to address
the stated legislative aims. Frankly, it seems excessive to even speak of
hedge fund regulation in the U.S., since the only rules impacting hedge
funds are the ones introduced by PFIARA regarding the registration of
managers and the disclosure of data to the SEC and investors, in addition to
the general rules introduced in 2007 prohibiting all investment advisers
from committing fraud and the SEC’s custody rule introduced in 2010.205
Even if all these provisions represent a step forward compared to the
past, they can hardly suffice to prevent the creation and spread of systemic
204. See generally Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 11, and 15 U.S.C.)
205. See George & Dymally, supra note 22, at 222–23 (“Following the Goldstein decision, the
SEC adopted Rule 206(4)-8 as an amendment to the Advisers Act in order to enforce action
against advisers who defraud investors or prospective investors in a hedge fund or other pooled
investment vehicles. Under the new rule, advisers of pooled investment vehicles are prohibited
from making false or misleading statement to, or otherwise defrauding, investors or prospective
investors in those pooled vehicles. A prime example in which the SEC alleged a violation of Rule
206(4)-8 is the complaint against Stanley Chais, a California based broker-dealer who solicited
and raised approximately a billion dollars from investors for Bernard L. Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.
Madoff, who was previously charged with SEC fraud violations, employed the assistance of
several ‘feeders” of investment funds to solicit investors because “he [Madoff] was too successful
to trouble himself with marketing to new investors.’ One of those feeders was Chais who managed
three funds valued at close to $1 billion, all of which were invested with Madoff. In 2009, the SEC
charged Chais with fraudulent conduct based on misstatements and omissions concerning his
management of the Funds’ assets under the Securities Act, including violations of Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. The SEC’s complaint against Chais alleged that Chais held
himself out as an investment wizard with 40 years of experience when, in fact, he was no more
than an unsophisticated investor who simply turned all of the funds’ assets over to Madoff while
charging the funds more than $250 million in fees for his purported ‘services.’ Chais made claims
to the funds’ investors that he formulated and executed the funds’ trading strategy when, in reality,
it was Madoff who managed all of the funds’ assets. Most of the funds’ investors were unaware
that Chais invested with Madoff until after Madoff’s arrest. In January 2011, the SEC dropped all
charges against Chais after his death at age 84.”).
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risks and they will likely be unable to adequately protect investors from
illegal or unethical conduct on the part of dishonest managers.206 The most
important new rules introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act are: (1) the
mandatory registration with the SEC of investment advisers with more than
$150 million of assets under management and (2) the duty to disclose a
significant amount of data to the SEC and investors. However, if its
legislative goals are to achieve financial stability and grant investor
protection, how can these new provisions suffice?
It is not clear if the mandatory registration with the SEC and the
consequent duty of disclosing information will be enough to address the
creation and spread of systemic risks. In fact, in this regard, the U.S.
regulation seems to be more focused on mandating the SEC to gather data
and information and less on seeking to eliminate or at least reduce systemic
risks.207 However, it seems that one of the main reasons why these financial
vehicles create and spread systemic risks is the excessive use of leverage.
Therefore, to effectively address this problem, it would be necessary to act
directly on leverage through the introduction of specific new rules.
In regards to the investor protection issue, even if the Dodd-Frank Act
claims to aim at protecting consumers from abusive financial services
practices, it is difficult to see which of its new rules are focused on the
protection of investors. If it is certainly true that the disclosure of data and
information by hedge fund managers to the SEC and investors increases the
level of transparency of the industry, at the same time investors will hardly
be able to benefit from the knowledge of these elements in order to avoid
being defrauded by investment advisers. Moreover, it is commonly said that
the SEC does not have a sufficient number of officials who can use this data
in order to properly supervise the hedge fund industry.208
Additionally, both the anti-fraud rule and the custody rule seem to be a
sort of “blunt sword,” unable to properly protect investors. The anti-fraud
rule is insufficient to prevent the commission of fraud because it simply
provides the prohibitions and the relative sanctions, but it does not
introduce legal mechanisms allowing these prohibitions to effectively work
by preventing illegal conduct. For example, classifying and regulating
murder as a crime, and thereafter providing penal sanctions for the criminal,
is clearly not enough to avoid homicides. To try to reach this result, it is
also necessary to have police on the streets in addition to many other
different kinds of security measures that are able to prevent their
206. Namely, the two legislative goals that the Dodd-Frank Act declares to pursue.
207. Kehoe, supra note 1, at 38.
208. See Schneider, supra note 14, at 291 (“[T]he SEC has limited resources to inspect hedge
fund advisers.”); see also Nelson, supra note 9, at 222.
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occurrence. For the same reason, in order to avoid fraud, it is necessary to
increase the security measures in place in the asset management process.209
Furthermore, even though it is true that the custody rule was
promulgated in order to counteract the occurrence of serious fraud and
misappropriation, some critical elements are still in place. In particular, it
seems that allowing investment advisers to self-custody the fund’s assets
could make it easy for them to act in conflict of interests. In fact, it is
obvious that if the assets are in the physical possession or at the disposal of
the managers, it is much simpler to steal or misappropriate them.
Additionally, the fact that the custodian does not have specific powers to
control the activities of the managers and stop them in case of illegal
behaviors—such as fraud or misappropriation—is a further serious
shortcoming of the regulation.
Finally, it seems to be inappropriate to give the managers the possibility
to self-assess the fund’s assets.210 In fact, they are in the position of having
an evident conflict of interest, given that they may want to overvalue or
undervalue the assets for their own benefit. For them, it could be
advantageous to decrease the value of the assets when an investor wants to
redeem their interests in the fund in order to give them back less money; in
the same way, it could be advantageous to increase the value when their
fees have to be determined, as they are calculated on the basis of the assets
under management and the profits gained by the fund. At the same time, the
misrepresentation of the fund’s performance and returns can fraudulently
attract more investors, showing a situation to be better than it really is and
allowing managers to charge undue fees. Hence, even with regard to the
investor protection issue it seems to be appropriate to reflect on the
introduction of some new rules.
VIII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO ADDRESS THE
SHORTCOMINGS
Systemic risk in the hedge fund world is often connected with excessive
use of leverage.211 Therefore, in addition to the disclosure of data, it would
209. See Schneider, supra note 14, at 291 (“The SEC’s current enforcement strategy using the
Advisers Act’s antifraud provisions is inadequate because enforcement, without the tools for early
detection such as disclosure and examination, is reactive rather than proactive to fraudulent
activity. In many cases, the harm has already been committed, such that the SEC is punishing the
wrongdoer rather than preventing the wrong.”).
210. See Sami, supra note 11, at 303 (“Currently, the United States relies solely on hedge fund
managers’ valuation processes, and does not require independent evaluation of these processes.”).
The author also emphasized that “[t]he [SEC] Staff’s main concern was the lack of independent
review over the process through which hedge fund advisers value their funds’ assets. This
deficiency not only raised questions about the true value of a hedge fund’s assets, but also raised
concerns about the ability of registered funds (that invest in hedge funds) to accurately value their
interests in hedge funds.” Id. at 288.
211. See Gibson, supra note 4, at 705–06 (“Regulation limiting use of leverage by hedge funds
could be justified because excessive leverage usage, combined with a hedge fund’s tendency to
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be helpful to think about the appropriateness of limiting the level of debt of
such financial vehicles, since it can have a strong impact on financial
stability.
With regard to the investor protection issue, looking back at the main
financial scandals hurting an incredible number of investors, it is possible to
discern that the most common types of fraud were (1) misappropriation of
the fund’s assets and (2) overvaluation or undervaluation of the fund’s
assets, performance, and profits. So, in addition to the disclosure of data,
the antifraud rule, and the custody rule, it would be wise to consider the
possibility of reinforcing the role and the powers of the custodian and
providing the mandatory involvement of an external independent valuer
with the task of assessing the fund’s assets on a periodic basis. Thus, in
light of the two main issues posed by hedge funds, this Article proposes to
introduce some new rules aimed at counteracting or at least minimizing
them.
The rules that could be useful to introduce are: (1) self-imposed
leverage limits; (2) mandatory appointment of a depositary-custodian with
more tasks and powers; and (3) mandatory appointment of an external
independent valuer. The first rule is mainly aimed at addressing systemic
risks, while the others aim at preventing the commission of fraud by
managers that could seriously harm investors.
A. SELF-IMPOSED LEVERAGE LIMITS
It could be helpful to state that the investment adviser must set a limit
on the amount of leverage that can be used for each fund, based on the
financial strategies that the adviser intends to perform, and then respect
such a limit.212 Leverage is a powerful instrument that is able to increase the
employ large-scale, aggressive trading strategies, could potentially disrupt the functioning of
financial markets, on a domestic as well as global level. In a volatile market, highly leveraged
hedge funds are much more vulnerable to failure because any loss incurred by the hedge fund
could deplete, or completely subsume, the existing capital of the hedge fund. Massive liquidation
of assets by the various creditors and counterparties of a troubled hedge fund simultaneously
could cause market prices to decline, creating very thin markets in which the various creditors and
counterparties compete with one another to obtain the best price for the liquidated collateral.
Declining market prices not only injure those creditors and counterparties directly involved, but
also affect market participants not affiliated with the hedge funds. Hence, employing leverage
increases the possibility that a hedge fund’s losses could be transmitted to its creditors and trading
counterparties and also be transmitted to other market participants unaffiliated with the hedge
fund.”).
212. A rule imposing self-set limitations to the use of leverage has been introduced in the E.U.
system by the Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2011 (AIFMD). See George & Dymally, supra note 22, at 262 (“One of the strategies widely used
by AIFMs, which magnified the exposure of the AIFs during the financial crisis, was high
leverage ratios. Funds reach those high levels of leverage when they engage in various forms of
borrowing activities, which create stress within the AIF financial structure to meet its obligations
during a market downturn. The Directive addressed this particular type of risk by requiring that
AIFMs disclose specified leverage information to investors including the amount of leverage
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impact of a financial intermediary on the market in terms of posing
systemic risk; so the fact that managers would have to self-set their own
limits and respect them seems to be an effective legal provision. To make it
even more effective, it would be useful to provide the SEC with the power
to intervene if the manager violates the self-set limits when this violation
can generate systemic risks, obliging them to lower the level of leverage
according to the self-set limits within a reasonable amount of time.
In determining this limit, investment advisers should demonstrate
reasonableness with regard to the financial strategies that they intend to
perform and the financial instruments and the markets in which they want
to invest. In this regard, some general principles could be set directly by the
SEC. For example, hedge funds employing financial strategies that are
particularly risky, such as massive purchases of speculative derivatives,
aggressive use of short selling, and concentration of significant parts of the
portfolio in a small number of positions, should self-set and respect
leverage limits that should be lower than the ones set by hedge funds
employing less risky financial strategies, such as corporate activism.
There are different methods to calculate the amount of leverage of an
entity. The ones used by FSOC are: (1) borrowing divided by net asset
value (borrowing/NAV); it provides a measure of credit exposure relative to
shareholder assets but does not measure synthetic leverage obtained through
derivative investments; (2) gross asset value divided by net asset value
(GAV/NAV); it provides a measure of financial leverage obtained through
the use of cash borrowings (including repo, prime brokerage borrowing,
and other secured and unsecured borrowing), but only includes the market
value of derivatives and thus may understate synthetic leverage; and (3)
gross notional exposure divided by net asset value (GNE/NAV); it provides
the summed absolute values of long and short notional positions. This third
measure incorporates financial and synthetic leverage, but has limitations.
First, the summing of long and short positions ignores favorable effects of
hedging or offsetting positions, which may reduce risk. A related
shortcoming is that it treats all notional derivative values equally when
calculating leverage levels, so it does not capture differences in risk
exposure across different classes of derivatives. However, notional
exposure on Form PF is adjusted for certain derivative instruments; funds
report delta-adjusted values for options and 10-year bond equivalent values
for interest rate derivatives.213 In order to get a more consistent picture of
employed and that they submit reports on leveraging levels and other relevant leveraging
information to competent authorities. AIFMs must set a maximum level of leverage, which they
employ on behalf of each AIF managed. When it is deemed necessary and after proper notification
has been given, the competent authority of the relevant home Member State shall impose limits on
the level of leverage that AIFM may employ, or place other restrictions on the management of an
AIF.”).
213. FSOC UPDATE, supra note 23, at 16.
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the debt situation, it would be helpful to combine all of these methods, as
each of them is able to show different aspects of the phenomenon.
It is rather likely that the proposal to set a leverage cap for investment
advisers will be strongly criticized. Many will say that leverage is useful to
provide liquidity to the markets and counteract financial shocks, allowing
funds to take contrarian positions in distressed markets.214 In addition, it
also allows hedge fund investors to make more significant profits. In the
past, others have argued that the best way to counteract the excessive use of
leverage by hedge funds was “the exercise of greater market discipline” by
lending institutions,215 meaning that it would be much better to put these
limits on the hedge fund counterparties, mainly their prime brokers.216
However, such a provision would not be effective given that hedge fund
managers could easily “swallow” it by using prime brokers established
outside the U.S., for instance in the United Kingdom, who are not subject to
U.S. regulation.
To demonstrate that such measures are not enough to prevent this
problem, it suffices to look at the terrific level of leverage many financial
institutions of every kind carried before the global financial crisis of 2007-
2008. Therefore, even if some of these arguments are understandable from
the industry standpoint, the priority of the financial regulation should be to
seek to prevent such a crisis from occurring again. It is hard to deny that
one of the main reasons for the global financial crisis was the inconsiderate
use of debt, not only by hedge funds, but in general by many different
financial institutions. Moreover, so long as limitations on the use of such a
powerful instrument as leverage can help avoid global meltdowns, or at
least make them less painful, it seems wise to consider their introduction in
the regulation.217
In this regard, a reasonable compromise between this fundamental aim
and the one of the industry to use leverage could be found in the provision
214. See Nabilou & Pacces, supra note 3, at 193 (“Due to pro-cyclicality of capital
requirements, in times of market distress, most financial institutions facing leverage constraints
are likely to deleverage and possibly cause fire sales and asset price downward spirals. Hedge
funds, however, can step in and buy the assets. This function can mitigate and smooth the effects
of shocks to asset prices in distressed markets, but leverage requirements would most likely
undermine the beneficial contribution of hedge funds to the stability of financial markets.”); see
also Gibson, supra note 4, at 706 (“Public regulation imposing capital and margin requirements
on hedge funds to constrain their use of leverage would be an inefficient and unnecessary means
of addressing systemic loss. Restricting the use of leverage by hedge funds would impair the
financial markets. Leverage allows hedge funds to buy and sell assets against prevailing market
prices, thus providing liquidity to those markets.”).
215. See Gibson, supra note 4, at 706–07.
216. See Nabilou & Pacces, supra note 3, at 207–08 (arguing that the best solution to address
the creation and spreading of systemic risks in the hedge fund industry is through indirect
regulation, namely, regulation of the hedge fund counterparties, like the prime brokers).
217. See Martin, supra note 60, at 110 (“[T]he possibility of imposing specific limitations on
hedge funds’ leverage exposure and speculative trading activities should be further explored, since
overindulgence in these undertakings could expose the general public to excessive harms.”).
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to self-set limits that have to be fixed on the basis of a number of criteria,
such as the financial strategies used by the manager, the types of assets
purchased by the fund, and the markets in which it invests. A rule like this
could allow the managers to pursue their financial goals while
simultaneously helping to avoid unmanageable debt situations, such as that
occurred in the period before the crisis.
B. THE INDEPENDENTDEPOSITARY-CUSTODIAN
The mandatory involvement of an independent depositary-custodian is
a measure that has been recommended even by IOSCO.218 This rule appears
very useful to avoid cases of misappropriation of fund assets, given that in
this way funds are physically segregated and held by a third institution that
has to be independent from the hedge fund and hedge fund manager.219 In
fact, as the Madoff case has shown,220 albeit in the broker-dealer sector,
investments are placed in jeopardy if independent custodians do not
properly safeguard the fund’s assets.
A custody rule is already in place under the federal securities laws, but
to make this rule really effective it should be mandated that there can be
only one depositary-custodian for each fund managed by every investment
adviser and, above all, that such a custodian is responsible for properly
controlling and overseeing all the manager’s activities. In other words, the
role and function of the depositary-custodian should be rethought. Its
involvement in the asset management process should be viewed as a means
to grant more protection to the fund’s investors. To get this result, it is
necessary to provide through new rules more functions and powers to the
depositary-custodian. Practically speaking, this goal could be reached by
giving the custodian the power to control before and execute after the orders
transmitted by the manager, only if these orders are compliant with the law,
as well as with the fund’s instrument of incorporation and the investment
contracts. In other words, in order to move the fund’s assets, for example
buying or selling securities, the investment adviser should pass through the
depositary-custodian, who would know in advance the purposes of the
investment choices of the fund manager. In this way, the custodian could
understand in advance if the real reason for these orders is to steal the assets
or to commit other kinds of fraud, and if so, the custodian could stop the
transaction.
218. See INT’L ORG. SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES
REGULATION (2010), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf [hereinafter
SECURITIES REGULATION] (mentioning among its principles the concept of segregation, by saying
that there should be adequate segregation and protection of client monies and assets); see also
Karmel, supra note 11, at 849.
219. The rationale behind this rule is represented by the crucial need to separate asset
safekeeping and management functions, and to segregate investor assets from those of the
manager.
220. George & Dymally, supra note 22, at 230 n.130.
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This means that the function of the depositary-custodian should be
redefined as a sort of independent controller involved in the service in order
to protect the interests of the investors. To do so, in addition to the custody
of the assets, the task of this controller should be to oversee the activities
performed by the investment adviser in order to find out—if possible in
advance—and prevent irregularities of every kind such as fraud, theft, and
misappropriation.
In more detail, the depositary-custodian should: (1) monitor the fund’s
cash flows, (2) ensure that investor money and cash belonging to the fund
are booked correctly on accounts opened in the name of the fund, (3) safe
keep the fund’s assets, (4) verify the ownership of all the fund’s assets, (5)
oversee that all payments made by the investors upon the subscription of
units or shares have been received and have been booked in cash accounts
opened in name of the fund, (6) oversee that the sale, issue, repurchase,
redemption, and cancellation of units or shares of the fund are carried out in
accordance with the fund’s instrument of incorporation and the investment
contracts, (7) oversee that the value of the units or shares of the fund is
calculated in accordance with the fund’s instrument of incorporation and the
investment contracts, (8) carry out the instructions of the investment
adviser, unless they conflict with the law, the fund’s instrument of
incorporation, or the investment contracts, (9) oversee that in transactions
concerning the fund’s assets the price complies with the market values, (10)
oversee that the fund’s income is used in accordance with the fund’s
instrument of incorporation and the investment contracts, (11) check the
consistency between the number of units or shares issued and the
subscription proceeds received, and (12) check that the external
independent valuer’s asset valuation is done properly and carefully.
The result would be a working structure of the hedge fund built on the
basis of the so-called “investment triangle model,” with the three corners
being: (1) the investors, (2) the asset manager, and (3) the depositary-
custodian, with the fund itself in the center.221 This means that the asset
manager decides the investment strategies while the custodian holds the
assets on behalf of the fund, monitors the behavior of the manager, and
intervenes in case of violation of the law, the fund’s instrument of
incorporation, or the investment contracts, in order to grant more protection
to the investors.
To avoid serious conflicts of interest, the prime brokers should not be
appointed as custodians, since they typically act as counterparties to hedge
funds and therefore they cannot at the same time act in the best interest of
221. The “investment triangle model” is the working structure of the European Union
Undertakings for the Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS schemes) under the
UCITS Directive. See Marco Bodellini, Does it Still Make Sense, From the EU Perspective, to
Distinguish Between UCITS and Non-UCITS Schemes?, 11 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 528 (2016); see also
Zetzsche, supra note 21, at 13.
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the fund, as should be required of a custodian. Given that to properly
perform this important function the custodian needs a certain amount of
information, the contract between it and the hedge fund should regulate the
flow of this information. As already provided by the SEC’s custody rule, it
seems appropriate that the function of custodian can be performed only by
banks and broker-dealers. However, it should be prohibited for the
investment advisers to act as a custodian of the funds they manage.
The need for a depositary-custodian with this role and these types of
powers is clear given the scandals from the past; the need lies in the
assumption that the SEC does not have enough human resources to oversee
the entire hedge fund industry.222 For this reason, it is necessary to develop
other ways to protect investors. One of these alternative ways could be to
amend the Investment Advisers Act and the SEC’s custody rule,
introducing provisions aimed at giving the depositary-custodians new
functions and empowering them to act properly and effectively in the
interest of investors, like a kind of independent legality controller involved
in their interest.
The hedge fund industry will likely strongly criticize this proposal, as it
will cause a significant increase to the costs of compliance. Even if the
involvement of a depositary-custodian with this kind of function would
cause a significant increase in costs, it is likely that its subsequent effect
would be an increase in confidence on the part of investors towards these
financial vehicles. In fact, if this mechanism works, fraud and
misappropriation should become less frequent. This could mean that many
new investors would be willing to invest in hedge funds with the result that
these new compliance costs would be covered by the increase in the assets
under management.
C. THE EXTERNAL INDEPENDENTVALUER
The obligation to involve an independent valuer with the task of
evaluating the assets of the fund on a periodic basis is particularly useful to
avoid inappropriate assessment of the assets’ value as well as
misrepresentations of the fund’s performance and returns.223 The risk that
this provision seeks to address is represented by the potential interest of the
222. See Schneider, supra note 14, at 291 (“[T]he SEC has limited resources to inspect hedge
fund advisers.”); see also Nelson, supra note 9, at 222.
223. See SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 218 (including among its principles a mention of
this concept, by saying that there should be robust valuation process); see generally Karmel, supra
note 11; accord Sami, supra note 11, at 303–04 (“One way of ensuring investor protection is
through independent, third party valuation of hedge funds’ assets, especially when hedge funds are
heavily invested in illiquid assets. Currently, the United States relies solely on hedge fund
managers’ valuation processes, and does not require independent evaluation of these processes.
Although Principle 9.2 of the 2007 PWG Report advises managers to comply with ‘industry sound
‘standards’’ in establishing valuation procedures, it seems that the onus is placed on the shoulders
of investors, creditors, and counterparties to inquire into a fund’s valuation procedures.”).
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manager to increase or decrease the valuation of the assets based on their
own convenience.224 To effectively counteract this risk, it seems appropriate
to provide that the valuation of the fund’s assets has to be done by an
external independent valuer without any kind of relationship with the fund
or the fund manager, in order to avoid conflicts of interest that could
potentially damage the position of investors. Typically, either financial
intermediaries or independent accounting firms would be the most reliable
industry participants to provide this kind of service.
CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to demonstrate that there is a need for new hedge
fund rules aimed at avoiding the creation and spread of systemic risk, on the
one side, and protecting the investors from fraud and theft on the other. It is
likely that this Article’s proposal to enhance the regulation and supervision
of hedge funds by introducing new rules and empowering the SEC will be
strongly criticized by many scholars and the industry itself. It is quite
foreseeable that the industry will take a position against this proposal as its
first effect would be an increase in the costs of compliance that both the
investment advisers and the hedge funds would have to bear, while
simultaneously decreasing investment freedom. Additionally, many
commentators will argue that more regulation and more supervision are not
necessary because hedge fund managers and hedge funds are already
subject to them. They will justify this statement by saying that there are
already in place anti-fraud rules, provisions on the custody of the fund’s
assets, as well as the duty to register with the SEC and disclose a great deal
of data and information. Further, in light of this proposal, the industry could
potentially react by threatening to move abroad to jurisdictions where the
regulations are more lenient.225
However, these arguments cannot be shared as the current rules are
inappropriate, or at least are insufficient, to address the problems that hedge
funds can cause to investors and markets. Also, the industry’s threat to
move abroad can be easily counteracted, because as long as the main
market to sell hedge fund interests is the U.S. market, the U.S. legislature
224. See George & Dymally, supra note 22, at 262 (“Investors suffer losses when there is an
inaccurate valuation which leaves them with a diminished pool of assets when they redeem. Also,
fund managers have an incentive to overvalue the assets when their remuneration is partially
dependent on their value.”).
225. Desmet, supra note 12, at 26 (“[O]verregulation in the U.S. markets will result in hedge
fund advisers relocating offshore, where they would face less regulatory scrutiny.”); see also
Gibson, supra note 4, at 706 (arguing that introducing limits to the use of leverage “would
probably only result in the emigration of hedge funds offshore to countries with less restrictive
regulation. The movement of hedge funds to offshore locations would frustrate any ability of the
U.S. financial regulators to monitor their trading activity, which, nevertheless, would continue to
impact the U.S. markets. Private regulation achieved through the exercise of market discipline,
both by hedge funds and by those with whom they trade, can provide a more effective means of
constraining the use of leverage.”).
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and regulators will have the power to impose the rules that they think are
appropriate. And if the investment advisers want to access this market they
will be obliged to respect these rules. Even though the application of these
rules can be costly for the investment advisers, this price is reasonably
motivated by very important legislative aims such as investor protection
and systemic risk prevention.
Beyond the interests of the hedge fund managers, an advanced and
well-functioning financial market is predicated on the confidence of
investors.226 Investors can only be confident if the regulation demonstrates
the ability to minimize the opportunities for financial intermediaries to
cheat and defraud them,227 and to negatively impact the markets by creating
instability. This is why financial regulation is so important in general and
why hedge fund regulation is necessary regardless of the features and skills
of the investors who are allowed to buy interests in these financial entities.
226. See Martin, supra note 60, at 1186 (“If investors believe that regulators are appropriately
monitoring fraud, conflicts of interest, and other financial abuses, then they would be more willing
to invest in various markets. Limited investor confidence can eventually constrain liquidity by
pushing investors out of the capital markets into safer investments, such as treasury bonds. This
can lead to decreased gains for existing stockholders, lower amounts of spending, other major
cutbacks by companies, and slower economic growth.”).
227. See Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game 21 (UCLA Sch. of L., Research Paper
No. 02-18, 2002), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=322301 (“American investors must believe that
somehow the legal system constrains these individuals sufficiently that the benefits of investing
outweigh the risks. They must believe that the regulators are regulating, and the watchdogs are
watching. In other words, investors may not need to trust people before they are willing to give up
their hard-earned dollars. But they must at least trust the system.”) (emphasis in original).
